

A SURVEY OF THE GREATER DALLAS CRIME COMMISSION AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

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This thesis examines the history of the Greater Dallas Crime Commission and its effectiveness within the criminal justice system. It is a private agency established fifty (50) years ago to monitor and investigate the criminal justice system. Today, it serves as a source of funding for criminal justice agencies, provides awards and recognition forums for law enforcement and lobbies for legal revisions of the criminal code. The research is designed to examine their role within the criminal justice system. Whether current crime theories are supported by the commission is central to the thesis.

There are no prior studies available of crime commissions perhaps because they are privately funded and operated by civilians. Crime commissions do exert influence, politically and financially, upon law enforcement. It is reflected often in their history. The extent of this effect is the subject of the paper.

To this end, the commission's role in changing state laws, providing funds for police training, recognizing prosecutors and paying awards to informants lends credibility to their role in the criminal justice system. Their function has often changed during the fifty-year history. If there is a deficit, it may be that the commission has the capability, through its sphere of influence, of encouraging civilian actions that may conflict with law enforcement policy. Some examples of these are included in the study.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
Chapter One.....	6
Background	6
Discussion.....	10
History.....	13
The Frustrated but brief history of the Dallas County Crime Commission.....	19
The Dallas Crime Commission Begins.....	22
CHAPTER TWO	
GettingStarted.....	29
Discussion.....	45
CHAPTER THREE	
McKee’s Era.....	51
Discussion.....	71
CHAPTER FOUR.	
The Story Continues.....	76
1980-1990.....	88
1990-2000.....	98
Summary Analysis.....	108
Future Research.....	122
APPENDIX	
A-D.....	124-132
REFERENCES.....	133

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Introduction

Criminal justice agencies regularly ask the public for assistance in locating a fugitive, to help identify unknown criminal subjects, to participate in Neighborhood Watch Programs or to be part of Citizens on Patrol. Crime Commissions are promulgated to organize this assistance and often to ask law enforcement for help but more often to offer assistance. This study will examine the Greater Dallas Crime Commission, its history, why it was organized, who were the people instrumental in its formation and their motivation. Subsequently, the effectiveness of the GDCC in the past and today will be examined with records, interviews and analysis of the data. Current crime theories are examined in each period and measured against Commission operations. Discussion is provided of the GDCC's programs and functions that conflict or support these views.

Crime commissions have been in existence in the United States since the World War I era. They came into existence due to corrupt and ineffectual law enforcement at the local political level. It is/was their mission to aid in improving the quality and honesty of the criminal justice system. As civilians with specific interest in law enforcement, most members viewed their role as one that guarded the criminal justice system. They would personally scrutinize the conduct of the courts and provide assistance to police. Each commission too, would introduce

and assist in the passage of legislation that they believed was needed to enhance justice in Texas. In the earlier years, the commissions often paid for and directed criminal investigations. (Dallas Crime Commission newsletters and budgets, 1951-1972) The Dallas Crime commission has changed its focus in more recent years and concentrates on less intrusive programs to aid the criminal justice system.

Examining each commission in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this study. Records have been made available from the Greater Dallas Crime Commission (GDCC) that will provide a basis for future commission academic reviews. While this crime commission has existed for more than fifty (50) years, the events and procedures prompted, promoted or provided by the GDCC are typical of those around the U.S. and reflect the evolution of the criminal justice system. As society changes so have the civilian efforts of commission members. These changes, or adjustments, equally reflect some of the basic criminal theories used to explain crime in the new urban America. Criminal justice theories and studies often support and conflict with the crime commission.

When the GDCC began in 1950, there were serious public concerns about drug trafficking, liquor consumption, gambling and prostitution; crimes that were beginning to have a serious effect on the economic prosperity of Dallas. The city was growing with jobs that attracted people from other parts of the country and

from rural areas of Texas. Many of the new residents were not accustomed to Dallas' urban life nor its principles. Many saw nothing wrong with liquor, prostitution and certainly not gambling. These people had no local connections and were not predisposed to discontinuing their popular pastimes. Naturally, there were citizens who wanted to provide these services, legally or not.

It was this type of real-life scenario that led to the organization of the first crime commission in Dallas. Every period of its existence fostered some changes in its role. Studying the commission's history and the parallel crime history provides the framework to evaluate its performance. Using crime data, newspaper reports, interviews with commission members and their records helps to place the commission into historical perspective.

There are constraints to the evaluation of the Commission as many of the early leaders in the GDCC are now deceased and their limited writings leave little to measure the motivations that led to their decisions. Crime records are attainable but often do not provide sufficient information to measure their impact on citizens. Newspapers and other historical accounts provide some supplemental measure of the real impact from local crime. These omissions require the researcher to deduce from the available material the presumptive reasons behind certain crime commission policy(s).

This research will use available data to analyze the effectiveness of the GDCC. After each significant period, an examination of the criminal and other records will evaluate the commission's actions and whether its response was

appropriate to the events. This will provide a better window to view the effect of its actions and the cause that inspired its decision. When historical decisions are congruent with crime responses then the likelihood of commission assistance to the criminal justice system reflect a positive contribution. This then would serve to inspire further research of all civilian crime commissions. It would also assist in cities where citizens are evaluating their need for a crime commission.

To date, no one has examined crime commissions in an academic format. This effort may be used as a basis for further study. On a superficial level, crime commissions appear to be a positive but detached force to which the criminal justice system pays homage. They are usually made up of powerful political and business interest of the metropolitan area. Often members are able to generate support for legislation that affects criminal investigations and prosecutions. Commissions also provide funds and support for law enforcement training and equipment and rewards to citizens who assist police in investigations.

Two serious questions arise from the detailed study to follow:

1. Do the crime commissions enjoy too much influence over criminal justice policy?
2. Are they providing a useful addition to criminal justice and the public?

Within each of these questions reposes a myriad of smaller issues. This research covers a period of fifty (50) years creating conjecture that often the commissions efforts were justified and effective while on other occasions their work may have been less worthwhile to the community.

Crime commissions exercise considerable influence. No one can censor them nor change their operation or focus. So long as the commission operates legally, they are sovereign within the area they choose to exercise, e.g., if they decide to set up a crime stopper's program that allows police to identify unknown subjects and the programs funds this process they may do so. Alternatively, they may support legislation that conflicts with the desires of area law enforcement agencies or those of the courts.

The Dallas Crime Commission, later renamed as the Greater Dallas Crime Commission, was created because of real and perceived crime problems. The crime issues that kindled the original organization, will be discussed using crime reports and newspaper articles describing crime in the community. Historical law enforcement comments and discussions about crime will help demonstrate the pressure on city leaders to respond to the issue.

Support for much of the Commission's work is found in current criminal justice and sociological theories and research. Remembering that crime commissions grew from the same practices that led to vigilante organizations, it is commendable that so much of the work of the GDCC is encouraged by crime studies. Other research, clearly offers guidance for future crime commissions. There is no indication that the GDCC engaged in illegal conduct but in fact went to extremes to ensure the equitable enforcement of law.

Chapter 1 Background

There are approximately 20 crime commissions around the U.S. that are essentially independent of each other (see appendix A). Most are members of the National Association of Citizen's Crime Commissions (NACCC) but exercise independence of any central authority. They are privately financed and administered by locally selected officers.

The earliest crime commissions in the United States began shortly after World War I (WWI). Most of those early crime commissions disbanded during the economic downturn of the Depression. The groups that formed after WWII helped create similar groups around the country, Eg. Chicago helped Dallas and Dallas assisted in the creation of a crime commission in Ft. Worth(Crime Commission News, May/June,1952).

Fear of crime was the driving force in commission development around the United States. There are no instances of a crime commission forming without the impetus of some serious criminal activity. The leadership of the early commissions was business and political leaders of the nation. One of the early leaders in the national effort at creating citizen crime commissions was Virgil W. Peterson who was the Operating Director of the Chicago Crime Commission for many years.

Peterson wrote extensively about the need for public involvement in the criminal justice system. He noted American history was rife with illustrations where citizens became so distrustful of official ineptitude or corruption that they

formed vigilante groups and often used violence to end criminal activity in their communities. New York City formed the first citizen's group to non-violently end the hold of the Tammany Hall organization on city hall. This early group was led by Reverend Charles H. Parkhurst. It was called the Society for the Prevention of Crime and was organized in October, 1878. (Peterson, 1951)

The murder of two men in a payroll robbery pushed the Chicago Association of Commerce to appoint a committee of 10 citizens to study the growing crime problems. They eventually recommended the permanent formation of a "...body charged with the duty of securing the proper administration of such laws as may be enacted by the officials charged with such administration." This stilted phrasing simply meant that the organization would study the subject of crime suppression and prevention, and secure the necessary legislation needed to improve criminal law. ¹

Kansas City Law Enforcement Association followed Chicago's lead November 11, 1920. Afterwards came the Cleveland Crime Commission, the Crime Commission of Los Angeles, and the Baltimore Criminal Justice Association, Inc.

On August 12, 1925 a National Crime Commission was organized in New York City in the offices of Elbert H. Gary, then head of the United States Steel Corporation. Members in the national commission included Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, Newton D. Baker, a former secretary of War,

¹ Report to the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Pursuant to S. Res. 202, 81st Congress, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report No. 307, 1951.

and many other prominent men. In 1927 there was a national meeting of the group in Washington, D. C. with twenty-six crime commissions represented at the meeting. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, addressed the delegation. This national commission was defunct after only a few years.

This was true, too, of many of the local commissions. Only Chicago, Baltimore and Cleveland commissions continued beyond 1930. Most ended due to the economic crash of 1929 and the resulting depression. World War II further drove local issues out of citizen's interest in order to focus on the war effort.

By 1948, local concerns were revived and in June, 1948 , Peterson addressed 2000 Miami citizens about the need for a commission in their city. The Crime Commission of Greater Miami was established that year. Kansas City's Crime Commission was re- formed in 1949, 1950 saw the birth of the St. Louis and **Dallas Crime Commissions**. By 1951 the New York Anti-Crime Committee was functioning as was the Philadelphia Crime Prevention Association. Tampa, Florida and Burbank, California commissions followed in 1951. By 1952 a new National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions was formally organized and continues today, appendix A provides a list of the commissions in the national association.

The thrust of the various crime commissions was, and is, dependant upon local perceptions of crime in their area. Some concentrate on statistical analysis of local crime, others toward improvement of law-enforcement

agencies and others with organized crime, most include some of each of these elements.

The most constant requirement is that the commissions are independent of any official body. All the funding must be from the community in order to ensure an independent appraisal of the criminal justice establishment (Peterson, 1952).

In 1952, Peterson wrote, that the Chicago Crime Commission had an annual budget of \$150,000.00 raised entirely by the commission from its members or citizen supporters. There were 150 members but over 2,000 donors. This budget maintained a staff of 25 full-time employees including observers in the criminal courts, investigators and those who operate the office. They also functioned as a victim's information source by sending or telephoning the witnesses of the status of the cases, when they would be needed for testimony and when the suspect was released from jail. (A very early victim assistance association.) The witnesses were also encouraged to advise the commission of any new information, evidence or problems that might affect the case. This information was then furnished to the proper authorities. Investigators employed by the Chicago Crime Commission were former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or military intelligence. They concentrated on organized crime matters but did not usually collect evidence for criminal prosecution. They observed what official law enforcement agencies were doing and provided confidential reports to the mayor or other public officials for appropriate action. They would conduct investigations if a miscarriage of

justice had occurred, in these instances they did collect evidence. An example occurred when the commission received a letter from a black American complaining that his life sentence was not just and that he was innocent. Chicago commission investigators discovered new alibi witnesses and using a commission lawyer obtained his release (Peterson,1952).

Goals and ideology of the Crime Commissions have not changed over the decades. The Dallas Crime Commission varied its techniques and methods over the years as Dallas criminal justice needs were transformed during the last half of the twentieth century. The leadership in the Commission adjusted its operation to inspire community involvement and the requisite needs of the changing criminal topography. It is interesting to describe the changes in the Commission but it is equally revealing to note the similarities of goals and ideas between 1950 and 2000.

Discussion

Crime commissions are an outgrowth of 19th and 20th Century vigilantism. But by the time of the Depression, most American leadership stopped encouraging lynching and other extra-legal means of crime control. They realized that citizen action was required but within the law of the land. Many states proposed and passed anti-lynching statutes, efforts were made to increase the pay and competence of local law enforcement and law enforcement

began to require higher levels of professionalism. Each of these areas are priorities of crime commissions.

The history that prompted these ideas is discussed in an unpublished M.A. thesis “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Popular Perception, Crime History and Criminal Justice Policy” the author points toward the historical basis for the current get tough on crime agenda (Latham, 1999). Most current attitudes are influenced by the violent history of America. The sentiments have less to do with current politics or targeted crimes than the expectations of citizens. America’s violent history leads us to believe this violence is going to occur regardless of the crime or imprisonment rate; it is our historical perception of crime.

Certain portions of this idea grew from the force needed to control and conquer a new wilderness America. Public acceptance of violence was further enhanced with the era of vigilantism, a revolution, a civil war, labor unrest, civil rights’ violence and legal decisions by the courts. The example used by a Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes provided that an American should not be expected to retreat from the threat of force, which is a continuation of the old west confrontational self-defense. It is understood that when someone is threatened by violence, then violence is justified by the respondent; no one is required to retreat from danger.

The study also examines historical records of violent acts, crime and criminal justice history and is compared with the contemporaneous crime rates. Each era is treated separately to evaluate whether the rate of crime is equal to

the proposed treatment offered by citizens. It is a subjective measure since more accurate crime data did not begin until the Twentieth Century. Usually, the evidence points to an overreaction by local citizens resulting in vigilante or lynching actions. Occasionally, the reaction was proposed by local political and economic leaders in the community many times led by local police authorities (Latham,1999).

This is then expanded to the criminal justice system. If violence has occurred, then the suspect may also be treated violently up to and including the death penalty. These are the same ideas that have led to an increase in police numbers and prison expansion. Despite criminal statistics analysis that reflect the continuing static nature of crime rates, the American fear of crime drives the development of crime policy. Some theorize that even if the crime rate decreased to zero, there would still be a fear of crime that would generate more calls for prisons (Latham,1999).

Crime commissions provided a method for citizens to discuss and act on their concerns about crime, with the perception of history, but not the acts of violence. Civic leaders needed an organization to provide support and legislation for a community trying to reduce crime. Reducing crime and improving the business climate represented multiple benefits to the city, particularly, those cities like Dallas that were having difficulties with uncontrolled criminal violence. The Dallas Crime Commission provided a conduit for citizens to influence criminal justice policy and practice devoid of the threat of citizen violence.

History

Dallas Crime Commission history begins, literally with a bang, the sound of numerous shootings and bombings that had become routine in the post-World War II city. Dallas, like most American cities was suffering from rapid growth pains, uncontrolled gambling, drug dealing and many factions fighting over control of the illicit businesses. The conflicts between the outlaws led to open warfare on Dallas' streets. Newspapers carried stories of nighttime assassinations and assassination attempts by gangsters throughout the city. City leaders knew that some action was needed, since their actions nearly two decades before had sparked the current problems. Local, and often national, newspaper headlines and radio broadcast frequently let Dallas citizens hear about violent crime in the city. Many of the victims and perpetrators of crime were those involved in the area's criminal enterprises.

The seeds of crimes of 1950 had been planted years before in a business decision made for the Texas Centennial. Dallas' plan to host the 1936 Exhibition was a catalyst for actions that eventually led to the creation of the Greater Dallas Crime Commission. It was a bold gamble that paid off in notoriety, national exposure and the 1937 Greater Texas and Pan American Exposition. These events brought money into the city and consequently, crime.

Actively pursued by Robert Lee Thornton, president of Mercantile National Bank, Dallas offered the Texas Centennial Commission \$7,791,000.00

to win the right to host the Centennial. The funding came at a time when America was trying to emerge from a world-wide depression, it was an enormous amount for that period and won for Dallas the right to host the exposition (Payne, 2000).

Part of the crime brought into Dallas was through the city council's decision to "open up the city" to compete with Ft. Worth's Frontier Centennial Exposition. Ft. Worth's celebration was produced by Broadway showman Billy Rose with Paul Whiteman's band and Sally Rand's Nude Ranch. The Ft. Worth vaudeville shows were drawing the crowds away from the massive expenditure made by the city of Dallas. The Dallas city council decided to allow bookies, illegal liquor sales and encourage prostitutes to operate in houses and off the streets. (Payne, 2000)

The organization needed to direct and manage the Centennial and the Exposition inspired the business leaders to form the Dallas Citizens Council, a group of business bosses with the authority to commit their money and resources to any worthy project. It was chartered on November 22, 1937. This financially and politically powerful group would influence Dallas's development for many years including responsibility for the formation of the Dallas Crime Commission.

Naturally, there had been crime in Dallas before the Exposition and Centennial after all, by 1913 Dallas had over 131,000 citizens. This era was also marked by the 'social evil' of prostitution though it was not discussed openly in polite society. It was allowed by the city to operate on a designated 'reservation'

near where Founder Bryan had settled in 1841. (East of Lamar Street, from Cochran Avenue on the south to the MK&T railroad tracks on the north and bound on the east by a stream known as Dallas Branch or “Frogtown”, perhaps as many as 400 women were allowed to practice their profession there.(Payne,2000 and Homes, 1992).

Black Dallasites were not a factor in the 1920s decision-making process. Jim Crow laws were rigidly enforced. Post WWI era did not loosen the arbitrary controls placed on black citizens in Dallas or most American cities. Lynching and tarring and feathering were common. The city judge and sheriff were KKK members along with 16,000 others by the 1920s. The KKK demonstrated for white supremacy, and of course they were anti-crime proponents (Payne, 2000).

A strong anti-klan movement was led by C.M. Smithdeal and supported by Ben Cabell, G.B. Dealey, Alex Sanger, and Herbert Marcus. Organized opposition from local newspapers , the Citizen's League and klan abuses in other parts of the country led to their decline by 1926.

A police department and sheriff's office existed but was ineffective and weak. In the mid 1920s the police department had 150 officers who worked eight hours a day, seven days a week and given one day off a month and an annual vacation of one week. Annual salary was \$1,680.00 per year for a patrolman. The city commission did discuss providing uniforms for the officers.

After WWI Dallas began to see an increase in crime from bandits in “high powered motor cars” to gruesome murder cases, bootlegging and narcotics trafficking. Drugs were available in Deep Ellum, for instance, if you knew the

reefer man and you were a “muggle” smoker, marijuana (Holmes, 1992 and Payne, 2000). These and other consensual crimes were organized on a scale that led to fierce and violent confrontations between the groups.

By the end of WW II, many returning veterans were ready to terminate the rule of the gangsters and the crimes that were damaging the progressive Dallas business climate. World War II veterans ran for office in the 1946 elections. Several wanted the city's top law enforcement jobs, especially the county's highest criminal justice offices, sheriff and district attorney. Will Wilson and Henry M. Wade ran for the district attorney's office. Wilson was an SMU graduate and Wade a University of Texas law school graduate and former F.B.I. agent. Wilson won the election but made Wade his chief prosecutor. In 1950, when Wilson moved successfully into state politics, Wade took over as D.A..... for the next thirty-five years. In the same 1946 election Steve Guthrie, another veteran, defeated R.A. “Smoot” Schmidt who had held the sheriff's position since 1932.

They had their work laid out for them. Gambling, though illegal, was wide-open and anyone could gamble or buy illegally sold liquor throughout Dallas. The best known of the gamblers was Lester (Benny) Binion. For many years it seemed that Binion could not be put out of business. Whether it was his careful planning or luck or the fact he had protection, is difficult to judge from

history's retrospective. He was well-liked by many people, regardless of race or ethnicity, throughout the city (Payne,2000).

More serious criminal activity was proposed by people outside of the city. Interesting, because of the names involved, is a 1946 attempt by Chicago mobsters to buy the assistance of the new, and they thought, naive, Sheriff Guthrie. Dallas Police Chief Carl Hansson, who would remain chief for many years, had assigned a detective to maintain contact with gambling figures, including those from Chicago. Through this contact, Detective George Butler, Guthrie agreed to meet with the mob representative, Paul Roland Jones. First, Guthrie notified Chief Hansson, DA elect Wilson, and Homer Garrison of the Texas Department of Public Safety, who became an institution in the State Police. Recording devices were installed in Guthrie's house and recorded Jones offering \$40,000.00 per month if Guthrie would allow the gambling to continue. They would also insure his continued reelection. On December 18, the unofficial task force arrested Jones and accomplice Romeo Jack Natti, quite a Christmas present for the young, newly elected or appointed officials. They appeared before Justice of the Peace W. L. "Lew" Sterrett, soon to be county judge for many decades (Dallas Morning *News*, December 19,1946).

Under Guthrie and Wilson there followed a series of raids on gambling joints. Law enforcement pressure drove Benny Binion to relocate to Nevada where gambling was legal. He left much of his gambling operation in tact despite the efforts of his major competitor Herbert Noble. There was a natural

hostility between the Binion and Noble interest that resulted in periodic violence. (Payne, 2000 and Dallas Morning News, Dallas Times Herald).

Someone made many attempts on the life of Noble. On one occasion a sniper shot him. While he was in the hospital recovering from one of those attempts, another shooter missed him. His car was repeatedly ambushed. A car bomb directed at Noble killed his wife. Noble was finally blown to bits by a bomb in August 1951. His death ended the warfare (Dallas Morning News, August 8, 1951).

When DA Henry Wade replaced Wilson, Wade continued the effort to try to bring Binion back to Dallas to face gambling charges. His new case charged Binion with evading federal income taxes from his share in policy (gambling) partnerships from which he allegedly received \$30,252.00 in 1949. He was also charged with state gambling violations. The grand jury was led by businessman Jimmy Purse. Purse openly opposed Wade's efforts. Purse was overruled by the other members and died of a heart attack in Federal Judge T. Whitfield Davidson's courtroom while delivering the indictment. After numerous appeals and maneuvering, Binion was returned to Texas three years later. He received a five-year sentence for the federal charge and a four-years for the state offense of running a policy wheel. He was incarcerated at Fort Leavenworth for four years. Afterwards, he immediately returned to Las Vegas where he was a popular figure and casino owner. At his death in 1989 he was

eulogized by leaders at all levels of the State of Nevada, and the gaming industry as a man “of all seasons” (Payne, 2000).

These are a mere sample of the gangland warfare, criminal activity and generally colorful characters that gave Dallas headlines it did not want at a time when the city was building a reputation for business growth. Slowly, the idea for a crime commission began to develop among civic and business leaders. The seeds of the idea were planted as early as 1946 when 31 businessmen met to discuss the creation of a Dallas **County** Crime Commission. (A 1999 search of the Secretary of States filings revealed that this group did not file for a corporate charter.) The Dallas Morning *News* reported in January, 1947, about the difficulties of this first group. The article tells the story of the failed first attempt led by Albert Sidney Johnson. It did not succeed when the money could not be secured (Dallas Morning *News*, December 20, 1947).

The Frustrated but brief history of the Dallas **County** Crime Commission

Dallas County Crime Commission members first met in November, 1946, to begin the process of organizing. Later in the month they planned to meet again to discuss the source of financing. By this time they had created by-laws and were discussing how to implement their ideas to work with all law enforcement agencies for a “...fast impartial justice”. They wanted to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system and suggest changes to legislation.

The group also hoped to make the public more aware of crime and its impact and provide an oversight to the court's system. After the initial meeting there were between thirty and sixty-five members representing the incorporated towns and cities of Dallas county, city trade, civic, educational and religious groups and the press (Dallas Morning *News*, January 11, 1947).

The Dallas Council of Social Agencies recommended that the Community Chest (a forerunner of the United Way) fund the group for \$13,500.00. In December, 1946, the Community Chest refused to fund this early commission despite demonstrated success of similar groups in Chicago and Baltimore. Chief of Police Carl F. Hanson, Sheriff Steve Guthrie and District Attorney Will Wilson all supported its creation. Guthrie said that a commission can put the "...fear of God into those criminals. They're more scared of private citizens than of me or the District Attorney."

Major General Albert Sidney Johnson was the chairman of the early efforts at forming a commission and planned to meet with commission members to decide how to raise the necessary funds. The Community Chest's rules required that the new agency raise its own funds for the first year. Both the Community Chest and the Council of Social Agencies supported the creation, of this crime commission, based on its listed purposes: 1. To promote intelligent administration of criminal justice through co-operation with all officials and agencies; 2. To investigate law enforcement and prepare legislation to correct weaknesses in criminal procedure; 3. To keep complete records of law enforcement including a central index of all felony cases; 4. To

maintain a close watch over parole applications and 5. To keep the public informed of social and criminal problems (Dallas Morning *News*, December 20, 1947).

Major General Albert Sidney Johnson, who organized this first effort, spent 35 years in the armed forces with 30 years in the Texas National Guard. In 1958 his “day” job was as an investment banker with Rupe and Sons. (In 1999, Ray Montgomery remembered Johnson working at Rupe and that Johnson was very active in civic affairs.) He was not a physically large man, 5'8", 150 pounds. He was born in Paris, Tennessee and his parents named him for the Confederate Civil War General under whom his grandfather had served during the war. His father was allowed to give him his grandfather's commanders name because it “ takes one generation to get over being mad at the general.” A.S. enlisted in the Army in 1917 and was wounded in WWI in Argonne. After the war and law school at the University of Texas he was elected to the state legislature. According to the 1956 Dallas City Directory he was President of Rupe Investments at 820 Republic National Bank Building in Dallas. Governor Price Daniel attended his retirement party from the National Guard in 1958 (Dallas Morning *News*, March 30, 1958)

The Dallas **County** Crime Commission Johnson tried to start was referred to as “...never active” by 1949. Johnson said that the original group could never arrange the necessary funding needed to operate. District Attorney Wilson indicated the need while praising the vigilance committee formed by oilman Freeman Burford. Many hoped that the vigilance group would lead to a

citizen's crime commission. It was generally believed that an open , non-secret organization would be better than a secret one, such as Burford's.

Burford's vigilance committee was formed after his and the home of Harold Volk were rifled by thieves in University Park. Burford said his group was backed by \$50,000.00 from private citizens. He encouraged the Dallas Citizen's Council to start a crime commission. He wanted to disband his vigilance committee. (Recall that until the 1930s, vigilance committees were common throughout the U.S. Some continued or were formed in the 1950s. There is no record that Burford's group resorted to violence. It may have been akin to a citizen's patrol organization. Little information could be located about this group.) (Dallas Morning *News*, October 10,1949). A new effort to form a crime commission began shortly after the failure of the County Crime Commission.

The Dallas Crime Commission Begins

Initially, the new crime commission was to act in an advisory capacity to the Citizen's Traffic Commission, which had been active for years. But by this time, 1949, there was a strong movement to resurrect the old organization, now to be called the Citizens Crime Commission (it was incorporated as the Dallas Crime Commission Inc.). It was again supported by the Council of Social Agencies. Johnson agreed to lead the organization of the revived commission (he would actually become the second president after Alphonso Ragland.)

Membership in the new group would concentrate on "...outmoded criminal procedure, overcrowded court dockets, misuse of paroles and public apathy toward the administration of criminal justice." The new commission would include a representative of each incorporated city and town in Dallas County, similar to the 1946 organization attempt by Johnson. It would include a full-time director to be paid \$20,000.00 per year (actual salary was \$10,000.00). The goals stated were similar to those of the failed county crime commission. The new crime commission followed the standard established by Chicago and other national groups. There is no record that the commission had help from outside Dallas. But, it appears obvious from the organization used, that Chicago assisted in forming the DCC. Chicago Crime Commission speakers were among the first speakers for the DCC, i.e. Guy Reed and Virgil Peterson.

The *Times Herald* noted that the new commission would work toward a more efficient administration of criminal justice, *would conduct necessary investigations* (emphasis added), they would keep records of law enforcement, maintain close surveillance of parole applications, and they would keep the public fully informed about criminal justice issues. In a June editorial the *Times Herald* encouraged the formation of the group discussing the many areas in the city that required more community involvement. It compared the commission to the Traffic Commission which had been successful even though all its recommendations had not been adopted.

Discussion

By the 1950s, Dallas was on the verge of becoming a major business force in the oil and gas and banking industry. It was demeaning and frustrating, to city leaders, especially those in the Citizen's Council, that Dallas was better known for its crime than its aggressive business leadership. Whether justified or not, that was the perception of Dallas leadership. Newspaper stories from the *News* and the *Times-Herald* reported the shootings and other outrages, many on the front pages, and some that made national headlines.

According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1950, Dallas had 59 murders that year, 350 robberies, 626 aggravated assaults, 3,502 burglaries, 920 larcenies over \$50.00 and 1,508 auto thefts. Nationally, violent crimes had shown a significant increase only in negligent manslaughter. In Texas, Houston reported 91 murders, 318 robberies but only 233 aggravated assaults. Texas urban areas reflected a crime index increase from 62,197 in 1949 to 70,936 in 1950. In fact, all of the index crimes increased in Texas except aggravated assaults which had increased significantly in Dallas. If Dallas citizens examined the crime reports they could see that even the city of Los Angeles had only 63 murders reported and it was a much larger city, the population of Dallas in 1950 was 434,462. City leaders may have had a reason to be concerned about Dallas' crime, they were certainly concerned about the notorious headlines labeling their city as a violent one.

By 1952, the first full year of operation for the crime commission, Dallas murders had increased to 62, robberies to 387, aggravated assaults to

904, burglaries 4,111, larcenies 969 (over \$50.00) and 8,494 (under \$50.00), and auto thefts to 2,468. Each representing a noticeable increase in two years.

It is instructive to briefly examine Dallas' crime prior to the 1950s. 1930 was the first organized attempt to collate national crime statistics by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The city of Dallas was notable for the absence of crime reported to the national group. No felonious homicides were disclosed, although there were no November reports. The city reported 3 rapes, 47 robberies, 565 burglaries, 57 larcenies, 1800 auto thefts (this figure seems high and may be inflated due to a reporting error as the first years of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) were infamous for the cities submitting inaccurate data). A year later, 1931, Dallas reported 1 murder, 0 rapes, 64 robberies, 4 aggravated assaults, 203 burglaries, 94 larcenies over \$50.00, and 216 auto thefts. (Based on a review of the UCR submissions for 1931 it is apparent that the Dallas, December, 1931 report represented one month's data rather than the cumulative for the year.) Possibly someone did not yet understand the UCR program. The year 1931 reported that Dallas ranked above average in the number of crimes reported for cities over 100,000 but below that of two other crime commission cities, Baltimore and Chicago.

By 1939, UCR crime statistics reported Dallas crime rate had begun to increase with the population. The number of murders stood at 54, robbery 142, aggravated assault 211, burglary 1798, larceny 168 and auto theft 530. This latter figure for auto theft suggests that the 1930 figure of 1800 auto thefts was in error.

This cursory examination of the two decades prior to formation of the crime commission is indicative of some increase in crime over the period. It is not sufficient to warrant great concern without other impetus, Eg. business concerns and media reports of crime. The newspapers were reporting every significant crime event, some warranting broad exposure in the media (remember, very little television reporting in this era). There were several shootings and bombings where someone tried to kill Noble, a Chicago group attempted to bribe the new Dallas Sheriff and efforts to stop gambling had led to notorious courtroom conflicts with Benny Binion. Emerging oil, gas, banking and insurance business did not need this kind of publicity.

Citizen council members had the influence and funding to make a strong statement to the world that outlaws would not be tolerated on Dallas' streets. Dallas population had grown from 260,475 in 1930 to 294,734 in 1940 and by 1950, post-war Dallas had a population of 434,462 . Dallas was no longer a small North Texas community with rural leanings but a rapidly developing urban city with wide racial, ethnic and economic separation. Many of the new Dallas' citizens wanted to gamble, drink and have prostitutes and drugs available. It was not necessary to tell city leaders that a strong visible support for law enforcement was essential in removing the omni- appearance of Dallas' crime leadership. A crime commission would be formed in Dallas, with their leadership.

The crime influence in Dallas led this group of business and professional men to take action. Whether the reasons were consistent with

crime theories was not a consideration. Today, it is significant to examine whether crime commission programs support or conflict with current premises. Studies of these types of organizations are limited to examination of the scope of citizen involvement in the criminal justice system. Police want civilians to be willing to participate in the process; the question becomes one of degree. Attempts have been made to define the degree of citizen participation in criminal justice oversight organizations.

One researcher attempts to describe the limits of public participation in criminal justice policy since it is only with recent history that the government has borne the brunt of policing (Grabosky, 1992). The past hundred years has witnessed the government's gradual assumption of that power bringing with it the knowledge that law enforcement cannot perform their function without help from the public. Clearer delineations about citizen participation need to be examined.

Private security, community crime prevention, community policing, police auxiliaries provide established civilian roles in society. Vigilantism is not now acceptable and generally, police oversight committees have been appropriate for modern law enforcement agencies. Citizen awards for information about suspects, mediation of local disputes and victim assistance are also reasonable for civilian participation. The research examined by Grabosky reflects the changing landscape of private involvement in the policing process.

Conclusions expressed in this article are vague. Eg. *It is fine for some people to be encouraged to help law enforcement but not others.* (Emphasis added.) The author believes that some people who are simply “busy bodies” and are a detriment to law enforcement and should not be allowed to participate. (Grabosky, 1992).

Overall, he concludes that civilian participants in open or public crime control groups are a welcome addition to improving law enforcement while groups such as vigilance committees and “police informers” represent the repressive nature that can be attributed to some review groups.

It seems unlikely that law enforcement or courts or other functions of the criminal justice community will select which citizens participate and which are excluded. Open participation in oversight committees, or crime commissions, necessarily allows anyone interested to participate. The history of the GDCC suggest that there will occasionally be members that have ideas that conflict with the general population and may even cause some embarrassment for the commission. Some others may have unique suggestions that revolutionize a problem in the criminal justice system.

Chapter Two

Getting Started

The first meeting of the Dallas Crime Commission was reported on February 3, 1951 when 30 citizens met in a room at the Southwestern Life Building. The 30 were made directors of the new commission. The new president of the Dallas Crime Commission, Alfonso Ragland Jr, announced the appointment of five permanent committee chairmen. James Aston was named chairman of the membership committee, Rod Thomas, enforcement, Wilson Crook, publicity, Hawkins Golden, legislative and Stephen J. Hay, juvenile courts and activities. Ragland said he and the Commission's secretary Willard Crotty had visited with the Dallas Sheriff, District Attorney and Chief of Police to inform them that the committee did not plan to enforce the laws but to give assistance to law enforcement agencies. J. Ralph Wood said the commission endorsed the idea of another criminal court for Dallas and would work toward that end. The Citizen's Council had encouraged the Crime Commission to apply for a charter of incorporation (Dallas *Time Herald*, January 10, 1950 and Dallas Morning *News*, February 2, 1951). The charter was obtained and listed the original founders and members of the commission.

The offices of this first Dallas Crime Commission, Inc. were at 2022 Republic Bank Building. Officers selected were President-Alphonso Ragland Jr., (the Chairmen of the Board position was not designated until 1970.) The 1st Vice President James Ralph Wood, 2nd Vice President, Carl J. Rutland, Secretary-Treasurer Willard Crotty, and the Managing Director was Daniel G. Reynolds. DCC members were and are sought among citizens who will work toward Commission goals. They were selected because they had influence within their businesses and could make commitments without fear of reversal by their hierarchies, many owned their own businesses. Often the DCC recruited the top officials within the targeted organization. A sample recruitment letter from this era was located in the Dallas Public Library Archives. It was to the U.S. Postmaster for Dallas, who declined the membership due to the financial commitment required by the DCC (Solicitation letter, August 21, 1951).

Others who did become involved included Willard Crotty who was employed by Ellis Smith and Company. By 1977 he was with Fidelity Union Insurance and listed as with Ellis Crotty Powers and Company. He was one of the first Certified Property and Casualty Underwriters (CPCU) in Dallas. James Aston was vice president of Republic National Bank. He was Dallas City Manager before working at the bank. Wilson Crook was President of Crook Advertising. Hawkins Golden worked at Leake, Henry Golden and Burrow on Preston Road. He was an attorney. J. Ralph Wood Jr. was vice president and Attorney with Southwestern Life on Ross Ave. Stephen J. Hay

was president of Great National Life Insurance Company. Roderic B. Thomas was vice president and treasurer of Rupe and Sons Inc.

Alphonso Ragland headed a local insurance agency, now operated by his son Cruger Ragland. Ragland was an enthusiastic hunter and skeet shooter as was his wife. He graduated from the University of Texas and when killed in 1958 was the Vice President of the national group, Charter Property and Casualty Underwriters. He was active with the Red Cross and had briefly taught English. His son, Cruger, remembers his father quickly correcting anyone's grammar. Alphonso Ragland's father had operated a trade school for many years (Cruger Ragland interview, 1999).

Daniel G. Reynolds was named Managing Director of the Dallas Crime Commission. He was at that time director of the Northwestern University Traffic Institute, Evanston, Illinois. He planned to take over the Commission on May 10 (he arrived on May 9). "Dan" was described as a husky , red-headed 49-year-old. He was paid an annual salary of \$10,000.00. Reynolds had also been a member of the Miami, Florida police department for 16 years. Between 1941 and 1949 he was field representative and assistant director of field services for the International Chiefs of Police (IACP). He was a native New Yorker and attended Northwestern University. He traveled extensively throughout the United States and was known as a teacher and lecturer in crime related areas. He was quoted as saying about Dallas, that he thought the commission job offered an excellent opportunity to help "keep a clean community clean ". Once he arrived, however, he began to speak publicly

about the criminal problems in Dallas (Crime Commission News, January/February, 1952).

Reynold's public approach was aggressive as reflected in his speeches. He warned the Dallas public that the city was ripe for the entrance of organized racketeers who had been uprooted by the Estes Kefauver (the U.S. Senate crime committee chairman) investigation. He said his northeastern associates believed Dallas was a place where shootings and bombings were common, particularly at one fellow, referring to Noble. Reynolds said that police in the Northeast believed, too, that Dallas let their "gangsters ride around in Cadillacs and let them have bail right after they were arrested." He hypothesized the main reasons for the **increase** in the crime rate was: 1.) An inadequate prevention program, 2.) Failure of detection and apprehension. 3.) Failure to prosecute adequately. 4.) Failure of courts or other agencies to deal with the criminal after he was brought into court (Dallas Morning News, July 28, 1951).

Reynolds was also concerned about public apathy. He stressed the need for public interest in crime control. Public concern was needed to curb the spiraling crime rate. In one speech he cited the following crimes and court proceedings occurring in Dallas and Park Cities on Friday in the previous twenty-four hours to emphasize that all was not well in Dallas.

Thefts reported 29

Robberies reported 1

Burglaries reported 10

Reynolds often expressed the problems, citing each of the core crime commission concerns: a less than adequate court system, lack of support for the police and a regular censure of the public's apathy toward law enforcement.

Like the managers and executive directors that followed him, Reynolds began to push for new legislation. His program for the legislature included parole/probation reform, bail bonds improvement, more courts, juvenile justice improvement, narcotics trafficking laws, and that better oversight was needed for the licensing of beer/wine . He intended that the DCC cooperate with the Dallas Bar Association (DBA) to effect needed changes. This cooperation varied over the years. In recent years there has been a constructive relationship between the DBA and the GDCC.

The January-February , 1952, "Crime Commission News" (the first commission newsletter)reported that the Managing Director, Reynolds, was working toward Model Criminal Legislation for the 1953 legislative session. He had consulted with the Sheriff, the District Attorney, local judges, the Dallas Bar Association and the Southwest Legal Foundation. The Commission was sponsoring a program with the Foundation to further the support for the new legislation.

The new commission had considerable influence and helped drive popular support for programs to *enforce* (my emphasis) criminal justice laws. This was reflected in 1951 when the state court inadvertently placed the wrong year on a convicted rapist's file that allowed him to be released on a

recommendation of pardon by the state Pardon Board. The rapist, one J.W. Connally, had a file jacket that made it appear he had already served two years of a five year term. There was public outrage at Connally's pardon which was exhibited in letters sent by Commission President Ragland. His letter was published in the newspaper. Governor Allan Shivers revoked the parole and Connally was quickly returned to jail (Dallas Morning *News*, December 8, 1951).

President Ragland had less success with gambler Benny Binion. Eventually, he was brought back to Texas, but not before Nevada friends of Binion caused Ragland some difficulties when he traveled there to offer testimony. The DCC had been instrumental in the indictment and assisted in bringing Binion to Dallas for trial. Ragland had a difficult time when he was subpoenaed to Nevada to testify for Binion's removal. Ragland reported to the commission that when he arrived in Las Vegas he was "harangued, harassed and dragged to Las Vegas for four days by those who oppose law enforcement". There is little documentation of this incident but it can be deduced that some Nevada authorities did what they could to block Binion's return to Texas (Crime Commission News, January/February, 1952).

Commission interest were broad in these formative years, much like today. A primary focus, then and now was decreasing the use of narcotics. One of the first major community projects was the printing and distribution of 10,000 brochures describing the signs of narcotics use, particularly by juveniles. Appendix B contains a sample anti-drug brochure of this era.

The name of the organization was simply the Dallas Crime Commission Inc. The first planned " annual " meeting was at the Baker Hotel on February 14, 1952. The speaker was Guy E. Reed who was the Chairman Emeritus of the Chicago Crime Commission. His speech was recorded and broadcast over WFAA radio. There were 135 in attendance at this first public Commission program(Crime Commission News, January-February, 1952).

In April, 1952 the DCC held another popular function in conjunction with Southern Methodist University (S.M. U.). This meeting was for judges and prosecutors to discuss organized crime. Senator Kefauver and Virgil Peterson were speakers. Peterson later toured the Commission facilities and met privately with Ragland and Reynolds.

Other activities and programs for that early period included a campaign to encourage people to pay their poll taxes. The DCC placed fifteen billboards around the city urging citizens to pay. The poll tax was a requirement to vote. The billboards were paid for by The Packer Corporation of Texas, an outdoor advertising company.

DCC also presented three television shows. One was with Representative Horace B. Houston Jr and Jack Nelson of Constructive Citizens, one with Mrs. George Ripley and William A. Ware of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and one show on poll taxes.

They also mailed 600 copies of a DCC promotional brochures and 2500 copies of the previously mentioned narcotics brochure. During this first year, Managing Director Dan Reynolds " inspected " three courts, two local

and one federal. (The only record is a mention of this activity in the DCC newsletter.)

“Crime Commission News” for May/June, 1952 compared the local crime rates with the national reports from the FBI. This newsletter also reported that President Ragland had met with the Fort Worth Crime Commission to help with their organization.

The Dallas Crime Commission examined and supported several initiatives to improve the Dallas criminal justice system, one that citizen’s take for granted at the end of the twentieth century. The local courts announced that they were about to be air conditioned so court could be held in the summer months. The DCC also discussed and aided the issue raised by the Citizen’s Traffic Commission, that the city needed more street lights and more police.

Near the end of 1951 Ragland turned over the presidency of the commission to Albert Sidney Johnson in a ceremony at the Hotel Adolphus North Room. A new set of officers was elected, many who were in office during the first presidency (Dallas Morning *News*, November 25, 1952).

In September of 1958, the DCC’s first leader, Alphonso Ragland Jr.,⁵⁵, was killed in a head-on crash north of Denton. Logan Mayo remembered his death in an interview in 1999. Mayo also recalled the trade school that Ragland (actually his father) and his family operated. In fact, it was Ragland’s training that helped Mayo get his first job at Sears. Ragland also ran an insurance agency. Both Logan Mayo and Ray Montgomery had fond memories of Mr. Ragland, remembering him as an enthusiastic and natural leader of any group.

Also injured in the crash riding with Ragland were his wife, age 31, District Judge and Mrs John A. Rawlins and A.K. Spalding. The party in the other car was also killed in the accident. Mrs. Ragland continues to remain under health care as a result of the accident (Dallas *Times Herald*, September 16, 1958 and 2000 interview of Cruger Ragland).

By 1953, membership in DCC stood at 90 individual, and 37 corporate members. The issues discussed in 1954 involved Reynold's concern that racketeers from Oklahoma and Mississippi were moving their crimes to Dallas and whether prison farms should be established in Dallas (Letter/memo to members, April 19, 1954) The Commission would pursue the idea of prison farms until the 1990s. DCC was beginning what would be a long-term discussion backing this idea. The leadership believed it would lead toward rehabilitation of offenders and would help lower the county grocery bill by the prisoners work on the farms. This proposal was never implemented in Dallas. It is one of only a handful of commission programs that was not adopted by authorities.

DCC embarked on a quiet program to establish some order in the investigation of liquor licenses. This initiative is surprising today because a non-governmental agency was able to decide who could or could not be entrusted with a liquor license. None of the agencies responsible had the manpower nor the time to effectively police the application process. Many Dallas observers believed that the failure to control this process allowed criminals to obtain liquor licenses. Others believed that liquor stores were

meeting places for the “criminal element”. The commission Managing Director Reynolds and committeeman C. M. (Pat) Ashby met with the officials, created a new form to include more background data and persuaded the county judge to extend the time for the investigation to ten days. DCC had complete access to Sheriff Decker’s files and soon had a very complete set of records on all the operators and the licensed properties. It was maintained by commission office Secretary Alice Gormley.² (Dallas Morning News, December 13, 1954)

Alice Gormley was the office secretary for the DCC. She would remain so until the 1970s. She was later named the executive secretary. Mrs. Gormley was closely associated with the DCC for many years and was instrumental in its success (Dallas Morning News, September 3, 1958).

Reynolds and the commission used their influence to gain the public’s interest in the fight against crime. In a speech to the Dallas Electric Club, at the Baker Hotel, he pointed to the increasing murder rate in Dallas. At that time he said Dallas was second only to Houston in leading the annual murder rate for the United States. He believed the city needed more and better paid policemen and the Texas criminal code needed revamping and modernizing. He wanted citizens to support the police and promoted the idea that the police should have more precinct stations. Since Dallas only employed 700 policemen for 200 square miles, every time a policeman had to transport a

² These records have not been maintained by the Commission for many years. There is an assumption that at some point the records were destroyed.

prisoner to downtown, his beat was neglected for much too long. He believed Dallas needed 1100-1200 policemen.

Subsequently, Reynolds confirmed that Mississippi crime was involved in crime in Dallas. He went to Mississippi and interviewed a suspect in jail who confessed to several burglaries in Dallas. He returned to Dallas and gave the report to DPD along with a tape of the confession. DPD followed up on the report and cleared 11 Dallas burglaries and returned several subjects to Dallas for trial. (There is no record that anyone in the history of the GDCC ever played such an active role in an ongoing criminal investigation.)(Commission letter, May 14, 1954)

Dan Reynolds also reported that recently two trucks from Dallas were bombed in Kansas City and another bombed in San Antonio. It was believed to be the result of a failed trucker's strike. On the positive side, the DCC had worked with a local women's group to establish the first city-county forensic laboratory.(Commission Letter , February,14, 1955).

Reynolds wrote articles for local publication including two for the *Town North* magazine. These articles "Is Texas A Magnet for Criminals" published in August and September, 1953 encouraged more citizen involvement in crime resistance and explained the criminal justice theories of how the newer, more mobile and suburban society contributed to crime. It is not known if Reynolds was familiar with Emile Durkheim, anomie, Robert K. Merton, or strain theories, but his article does assign criminal propensity to the

rapidly changing landscape of the cities and the displacement of primary controls.

Juvenile crime was not ignored in these early years. Much like today, the Commission knew that concentrated efforts toward youth would benefit the community, in the future. The DCC sponsored a meeting and a survey of Dallas County juvenile issues, it was believed to be the first such survey since 1945.

The issues and programs over the next few months included the very active role of policing beer and wine applications. Eventually, this would grow to approximately 100,000 records of applicants, their criminal records, and the records reflecting police calls to the property. The DCC also sent observers to a Tennessee prison farm to examine its feasibility for Dallas. John R. "Bob" Heston was hired as a full-time court observer. The practice of sending someone to each court to physically observe the judges and their practices was common among crime commissions. The watcher would note all significant activities of the judge particularly if there were too many probation sentences, failing to collect fines, too many short sentences or many others. See appendix C for an example of the court observer's survey.

In December, 1954, the DCC urged citizens to aid them in the crime fight. In a newspaper article it was noted that "last week" Dallas had five murders which was more than some cities have in a year. Throughout 1953, Dallas recorded 80 homicides.

In what, at first, appears to be a lighter side, the Comic Book Committee was getting local merchants to agree not to sell “blood curdling” comic books. Members of this committee visited local drug stores to check the vendors' wares. DCC believed that this type of reading was not appropriate for juveniles. In the mid-1950s, television was still in its infancy and the choice of movies ranged from westerns to romances with an occasional “scary” movie. Thus, comic books were the most popular venue, and one the DCC believed deserved their attention. This committee faded from the records by the 1960s(Commission letter, November 4, 1954).

Earle Cabell was elected President of DCC in 1955 along with a new slate of officers. This election is significant because of the financial problems that beset the Commission. All of the officers elected with Cabell resigned although some were reelected after the financial problems were resolved. The directors had submitted their resignation after the failure of the Commission 's financing. A new group was selected including a few of those that resigned. The new Directors were H.H. “Andy” Anderson, George Jalonick III, Albert Sidney Johnson, Mike Davison, John McKee, William R. McDowell, T.N. Sewell, W.E. Schoeneck The irony of McKee’s election due to financial shortfalls would be symbolic of his own downfall.

1956, marked the beginning of a problem that had killed the 1940s effort in setting up the commission. There was no money to pay the salaries or other operational expenses. On September 19, 1956 all the commissioners had resigned in protest for the lack of funding promised by the Citizen’s Council.

At the same time, Reynolds, the Managing Director, resigned to head the National Safety Council's traffic operations division in Chicago. Dallas Citizen's Council President D. A. Hulcy appointed himself, R. L. Thornton Sr., Stanley Marcus, Fred F. Florence, W. W. Overton, Jr., and Ben H. Wooten to find the money needed to permanently fund the DCC on a sound basis. The DCC required \$50,000.00 for operations. Funding of the Commission became a critical issue (Dallas Morning *News*, September 20, 1956 and October 3, 1956).

In December, 1956, the Dallas County Grand Jury urged the continuation of the crime commission because of the help that it provides County Judge Lew Sterrett to "sort out" beer/wine licenses. There was little fanfare as the Citizen's Council committee arranged the financial affairs to reestablish the DCC. There is no record of a similar funding problem, certainly of this magnitude, since this event.

Cabell congratulated the Dallas PD because prostitution was almost non-existent in Dallas. That announcement, whether accurate or not, was the highlight for the year. The following year was climaxed with an attack by Cabell on the parole process and the D.A.'s office. Cabell's and Wade's conflict was played out in the newspapers for several months. Included in this was a demand for a revision of the laws allowing extensive delays in prosecution after indictment, sentencing reform, reduction of paroles and clemency declarations and treating more of the juveniles as adults. Cabell's

attack brought down the wrath of D.A. Henry Wade and most of the criminal court judges; but it did produce pressure on area legislators to take action.

President Cabell took a personal hand in replacing the Managing Director. Bryce Alexander, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel was his choice. According to the *Dallas Times Herald* he had a background of legal training and was an Army intelligence officer. He was selected in February of 1957. He resigned effective October 1, 1958 to pursue other crime prevention positions. (Dallas Morning News September 3, 1958). This marked the beginning of John McKee's reign as President of the DCC, it is not known whether this had anything to do with Alexander's resignation although it also marked the return of Alice Gormley as the office secretary/administrator, when and how long she had been out of the office could not be determined through interview or records.

Later in 1957, the DCC agreed to appoint a committee to study law enforcement problems in connection with the pending integration of local schools. By this date, the notoriety of the violence and use of force in other cities had become national news. The study was requested by Jerome K. Crossman. Crossman, an attorney and developer, who was quoted in an the newspaper stating that, "We don't want the stigma attached to the city of Little Rock associated with Dallas." He noted that similar studies had been made in Louisville, Kentucky and Nashville, Tennessee, prior to those cities integration. Earle Cabell, the outgoing president, said that Chief of Police Carl Hansson was writing a special manual on the social change aspect of the

“...pupil mixing”. When completed the manual would be distributed to law agencies throughout the state. The idea of avoiding bad publicity for the city was not exceptional. Earlier in the history of the DCC, Crossman had publically noted that in the very nature of the work, the Commission cannot publicize “... its activities and that funds from the public are needed so that the Commission can keep things from happening that might injure the city’s reputation.” It is suspected that he was referring to events such as the bad publicity that accompanied violent resistance to integration of the public schools in other cities(Crime Commission News , October 19, 1957).

The July, 1957 DCC newsletter also praised the DBA for reprimanding fifteen lawyers for “running business” in the jail. (Barratry?) It also discussed the problem with pay for DPD officers who started with a base of \$340.00 per month after fifteen months. This contrasted with Ft. Worth officers only having to wait for six months to reach base pay. The newsletter reported the tally for beer/wine applications:

Beer Applications -279

Approvals-171

Denied- 100

Withdrawn-8

These first few years of the DCC had realized some of its goals. It had received, generally, favorable publicity. Partly because of the members selected, and that they were appealing to a large group of the population, they

were able to generate citizen interest in criminal matters. Certainly the appeal was predominantly to the white population of Dallas. There were no records of members from the Hispanic Oriental, or Black business community. From this distance of nearly fifty years, it is not known if there were efforts to recruit members from the minority community or if there were attempts from minority population to join the DCC. Popular exposure of DCC issues was critical for its success. Programs initiated by the first leaders of the DCC would remain important for years, some continue today. A much broader membership base is now represented because the leadership recognized that criminal issues affect all layers of society. It was reflected even with the proposal of Crossmen in 1957 asking for peaceful integration.

Commission projects addressing juvenile and narcotics' problems continued as the new president took over. Each year DCC administrators recognized the importance of encouraging juveniles to stay in school, to avoid drugs and alcohol. Other issues, such as pushing for a county prison farm faded as criminal justice needs changed over the decades. Commission members carried on with the mission of citizens' crime programs. Leadership changed the focus and visibility of the DCC, but rarely affected its overall objective. During the next fourteen years the trend would continue with a new leader at the helm who would eventually test the fortitude of the members.

Discussion

The commission had by now begun to recognize some of the influence it could exert within the criminal justice system. It was campaigning for new

laws at the state level, sending out brochures to help give advice on drug problems, sending speakers to civic groups to arouse public interest and to the media about court problems from probation to the types of cases the district attorney should be prosecuting. At this point, they were very influential in authorizing new alcohol licenses throughout the city. They would spend nearly fifty years attempting to get the county to build prison farms, unsuccessfully. Dallas Crime Commission members generally supported most expansions of jail facilities and had already assisted in the creation of a new court. As their history evolves they would concentrate on helping increase the size of and number of state and local prison facilities.

There is a continuing debate among professionals whether more prisons is a positive issue for reducing crime. One author addresses a portion of the prison expansion problem; the perception by Americans that we must keep building more and larger prisons to “control crime”. One of his concerns is the great amount of funds used to maintain this self-fulfilling bureaucracy. He believes the criminal justice agencies highlight the threats of crime rather than the reductions in crime (Chambliss,1999).

This book, *Power, Politics, and Crime*, further describes how the statistics reported to justice agencies is often augmented by the methods used in poor areas with high crime rates. After observing the techniques used in the Washington, D. C. ghetto, the author concludes that more aggressive enforcement styles cause the statistics in poor neighborhoods to be higher than that in middle class areas of the city. The author further points to the huge

prison and police enhancements due to drug investigations. He believes this primarily focuses on minorities and the poor, swelling their numbers in the prison population without significantly reducing crime.

Community standards and labeling are the subsequent areas of the author's interest. Often Americans label certain young people because of their middle-class background. These young people are involved in the same minor crimes as others but because of their environment, their crimes are "labeled" as "youthful indiscretions". Other juveniles from poorer circumstances or ethnic and racial differences are labeled as delinquents who need to go to jail, despite committing the same crimes as the first group. Chambliss believes these marks tend to stay with the young people into adulthood and often lead to adult criminal conduct. He believes that better education of these youths would diminish these differences.

Chambliss' book *Power, Politics and Crime* is somewhat opinionated in tone but with substantial annotation and documented research. His conclusions are well-founded despite a less than academic process. Often, he makes dogmatic statements about agencies that he accuses of single-mindedness. The fact that he proposes many changes that other criminal justice professionals support is mitigated by his opinions. Most agree that the prisons are too full of too many citizens and that poor people have a disadvantage in the criminal justice system. He points too to the plethora of prisoners being held on minor drug charges. These are the types of things that crime

commissions need to know to further educate the public and adjust their policies.

Chambliss' book could be a guidebook for crime commission policy and programs. Particularly, now that many political leaders are publically calling for ways to reduce our dependence on prisons for crime control. Commission legislative programs and their community support programs could provide an impetus to changes in government policy. Most of the changes suggested by Chambliss are not those that can be directed by police but must be promulgated by private citizens. There is no organized group of citizens, in this arena, more effective than the crime commissions.

In *The Politics of Prison Expansion* the author focuses on the state's governors as major instruments in the enlargement of the prison population. A portion of his research analyzes some Marxist theorists' suggestion that as society progresses, a larger portion of the population will become prisoners. Their idea is that the community will use the criminal justice system to control thinking, not crime. Other theorists suggest a more racially biased theory to explain prison expansion. Social control theorists believe that prisons would expand as crime rates increased. None of these theories were accepted by Davey, the author, and according to him, failed to explain the large increase in prison growth. Only the election of "law and order" governors explained the increases (Davey, 1998).

Davey examines prison expansion and crime rates between 1972-1992. Increases and decreases are correlated with the election of governors. Literature is examined to provide guidance and evaluation of the

theories. He attempts to apply known ideas about prison expansion. The conclusions reflect that the most common denominator is the election of law and order governors.

This leads to the author's concentration on the state governors. He believes that the governors who established reputations as law and order politicians, did so by increasing their respective prison populations. It is an easy, if expensive, apparent solution to crime. Higher and higher prison populations provide an immediate answer to crime fears despite evidence that the released prisoners pose a greater threat to citizens because of his "education" in prison. This is most evident when American imprisonment rates are compared with those of most industrialized nations. The differences lie in drug and homicide imprisonment where the U.S. has a far greater concentration than other countries.

His final conclusions are not surprising: politics play a greater role in prison expansion than crime or even the crime theories. It is of value when examining crime commission efforts since they traditionally have encouraged prison and jail growth. I doubt that any crime commission would appreciate this author's belief that by following this trend they were playing into the hands of Marxists and other theorists that the continued inflation of prisons is an American version of economic and social citizen control. Davey does provide useful data to help crime commissions decide on political proposals. They would do well to begin examining a gradual reduction of relying on prison enhancements and study methods of crime prevention. Davey also

focuses on the poor quality of training, counseling and education provided to prisoners. Any efforts to improve the status of prisoners, once released, could reduce the likelihood of his resorting to crime. Any combination of these proposals would be good projects for the crime commission.

Each of these authors offers substantial guidance to the crime commission. Certainly, the GDCC has often favored and helped gain legislation to increase the number of Texas prisons. Many of the commission members have made public, their concern, for both rehabilitation of first-time offenders and their support for programs to diminish the causes of crime in communities. The Commission's political influence would certainly be a powerful factor with future and current political leaders , such as the state governor.

Throughout its history, GDCC has tried to lead the community in directions that would ease the public concern toward crime and keep dangerous criminals away from the community. It may be that the Commission tried to do too much without concentrating on issues that would produce the most long-term benefit to Dallas.

Chapter Three McKee's Era

On October 25, 1957, John McKee became the new President of the DCC; he would remain President until 1972 when he was forced from office under a cloud of suspicion. He came to the Commission as an executive with the Ford Motor Company. The DCC, under Ragland, Johnson and Cabell, had made some public acclaim, under McKee they would be a more visible force. McKee became the symbol of the authority of the DCC, with the influence to effect most changes that he selected for the Commission.³ He was often quoted as saying "We think the public has a right to know what its officials are doing", referring to the Commission's role as a civilian observer over the criminal justice system. He involved the Commission in many controversial issues, some that drew criticism from public officials. He usually responded to such criticism by pointing to the fact that ".....we are not elected, we are not paid and we answer to nobody" or that there are no "...sacred cows" (Dallas *Times Herald*, December 19, 1968). His end would dramatically illustrate this belief.

McKee's first full year, 1958, was filled with mixed accomplishments and censures. It began with his criticism of the leniency accorded Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) offenders by the courts. It ended with the Dallas Bar

³ McKee's influence was enhanced by his leadership in the Masons. This aspect has been explored in prior articles about his downfall. This will not be addressed in this writing.

Association (DBA) criticizing the DCC for wanting harsher punishment for juveniles. The latter disapproval was directed toward the Commissions' program to give juries the benefit of a juveniles' criminal record for sentencing consideration. The Commission was opposed by Bob Stinson president of the DBA. He and McKee were often cited in the newspapers on opposing sides of this and other issues.

Interestingly, McKee's 1958 annual report reflected on an issue that would extend to the present day. He wrote about the need for strengthening the bail bonds and the bail bond law. McKee noted that of 417 persons charged with multiple offenses, many of the crimes committed occurred while the defendant was on bond for a first offense.

McKee included juvenile criminal problems in this area, stating that there were 36 agencies or organizations who studied juvenile issues. These public and private groups often pressured the justice agencies and judges to be lenient with the underage arrestees.

In October, 1959, the DCC hired a national auditing firm to determine whether the Dallas County Commissioners' Court was using its funds properly. This became a *cause celebre* and occupied both local newspapers for months. Another major effort of the Commission was to improve collections on bond forfeitures. The problem of bails and bail bonding was, and is, a pervasive and a difficult issue. There were never enough deputies to keep up with outstanding warrants and judgements. Commission examination was focused toward their concern that county funds that were not being collected and

judges allowing arrestees out to commit other crime (Dallas Times Herald, October 27, 1959). Bail and bail bonds became a different sort of issue when a portion of the Crime Stopper funds came from these payments in the 1980s.

Ft. Worth and Dallas Crime Commissions received national attention in November, 1959 when their combined resources hosted the National Association of Citizen's Crime Commission (NACCC) annual assembly. It drew hundreds of crime commission representatives from around the United States. Their program addressed each cities specific problems but primarily focused on racketeers and drug activity.

1959 marked an effort to combine the crime commissions of Dallas and Ft. Worth. Commission President John McKee named Jerome Crossman, C. M. Ashby, Willard Crotty and W. E. McAnally to work with a similar group from Ft. Worth. He announced this proposal at the annual meeting of the DCC where McKee was reelected to a second one-year term. Subsequent minutes, or other records, fail to reflect why this effort was not successful (*Dallas Times Herald*, May 24, 1960).

McKee continued to push for consolidation of the Fort Worth and Dallas crime commissions. Each of the commissions continue today as separate entities although they do periodically co-sponsor projects (Interview with former Executive Director Nickie Murchison , 1999).

McKee added some heat to the controversy over DWI by pushing for a requirement that offenders be required to provide a blood test. He asked for

legislation that would give the arresting officer authority to seize the offender's driver's license (Dallas *Times Herald*, October 27, 1959).

McKee's annual report established that the DCC would operate in the future under several permanent committees. The Board of Directors set ten of the committees: 1. Courts and District Attorney, 2. Crime Prevention, 3. Educational, 4. Finance, 5. Juvenile, 6. Legislative, 7. Liquor Control Board, 8. Police, 9. Probation and Parole, 10. Sheriff's, with two sub-committees for bail bonds and prison farm analysis. (DCC notes, 1958). Many of these, under different labels, operate today. The use of committees to investigate, study and support DCC programs was, and is, a mainstay of the Commission although the Dallas Crime Commission stopped conducting investigations in 1972.

DCC's examination of the bail bond problems reached its peak in 1959, when the committee called for a meeting to discuss this never-ending quandary. The Commission's influence was reflected by those who attended, included were all the Criminal District and County Criminal Judges, the District Attorney and other officials "...who would be concerned". This gathering illustrates the appeal and respect that the DCC held, only nine years after formation. Forfeitures improved, briefly after the meeting, but collections continued to be too slow (DCC letter, June 21, 1960).

The rapid increase in crime in Dallas became a big issue in 1960. According to FBI statistics Dallas and Houston were leading Texas in increased crime. Dallas led Houston in many categories.

The FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1960 reflects the greater Dallas area had a crime rate of 1,270.2 crimes per 100,000 people. This included 98 murders, 63 rapes, 566 robberies, 1,085 aggravated assaults, 5,998 burglaries, 2,283 larcenies over \$50.00 and 2,322 auto thefts. These crimes occurred in a population of 1,083,601. Crimes in the region had increased dramatically since 1959. Murders were up over 21 percent and robberies and burglaries had increased 22 and 28 percent respectively. All of the index crimes revealed significant increases.

By far, 1960's greatest notoriety was the DCC's continuing investigation of the County Commissioners. There were allegations that some or all of the commissioners were using county property and funds for private gain. The DCC hired two people, an engineer, and a former FBI agent, to conduct the investigation. County auditor Moore Lynn said the county had lost \$125,000.00 from the private use of asphalt paving and gravel hauling and the renting of county equipment to private entities. Whether or not the funds had been repaid to county coffers was one of the questions for the investigation.

The notoriety was compounded when County Judge Lew Sterrett disclosed he had revealed the information that led to the DCC investigation of County Commissioner Bill Coyle. Sterrett said he asked the DCC to investigate all the commissioners, including himself, to ensure fairness. There were charges that the investigation was timed to influence the upcoming election. Notoriety about the investigation was reflected in the local newspapers.

The DCC's audit of the Commissioner's Court was continuing in June, 1960 along with headlines of accusations and counter-accusations. The preliminary results had been furnished to the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury apparently felt justified in making an unusually public statement indicating they believed the acts disclosed did not constitute " criminal acts". The Grand Jury viewed the actions of the county commissioners as improper but not illegal. Their failure to indict led to an editorial response from the Dallas Morning *News* very disparaging of the grand jury (Dallas Morning *News* , June 2, 1960).

This incident with the Commissioner's Court was fairly typical of DCC actions under John McKee. He did bring the crime commission into the public eye and was not fearful of challenging the status quo. It also reflected the breadth of his influence. All of the propositions pressed by McKee were the result of close cooperation with the members of the Commission. These were men who ran their own business, were in top management of banks, insurance companies and law enforcement. They were not " yes" men but had their own ideas about crime and citizen roles. His fourteen years in the President's chair of the DCC was marked with many other incidents and proposals for legislative changes, local court procedural modifications and programs for better citizen involvement. Despite his ending, many of these ideas were far-reaching and even ahead of their time.

It was during this period that McKee told the story of his upbringing in Harrisburg, Pa, when at age 12 his mother, father, two brothers and a sister

died of influenza. His mostly fictional account would eventually cause his downfall. According to McKee, the death of his family occurred in 1919. He was forced to live for one and one-half years with an aunt until her death. He told the story that afterwards he moved to New York, attending New York University. He managed to work his way through school, receiving a Bachelor of Science degree in 1929. Much of this story later proved to be less than accurate. This information would provide fodder to derail McKee's career in a few short years.

Meanwhile, the proposal, fought by the DBA, that the defendant's criminal record could be given to the jury for sentence assessment was being promulgated by McKee as the "California" law since it was already in practice there. Today, juries may be given a defendant's prior record to assist in setting punishment. In the federal system the jury does not assess punishment, that is done by the judge and he/she may consider prior criminal history in establishing the sentence. McKee continued to push for more punitive treatment of DWI offenders. He had proposed, in 1958, that upon the first offense the defendant should be forced to take a blood test, have his car impounded and he should pay a cash bond of \$1000.00. Conviction at the first offense would warrant seventy-two (72) hours in jail and loss of license for six months. If there was a second offense the defendant would receive an automatic one year in jail (Annual Report, 1960).

McKee was an early proponent of trying sixteen year-old juveniles as adults and raising the maximum sentence for murder without malice from two

to five years to five to twenty-five years. He wanted the judge to have discretion on whether or not to hold separate trials when there was more than one defendant. The judge, would also decide whether one defendant would be allowed to testify against the other. He wanted to examine the reason the grand jury, there was only one grand jury in 1960, returned so many no-bills. McKee continued to examine methods to improve weak bail bond laws (Crime Commission Annual Report, 1960).

Another well-publicized 1960 proposal from McKee, and the DCC, was a recommendation that permits should be required for gun ownership and that the police department approve each purchase of guns. This proposal received wide-spread publicity. The DCC led a strong effort to gain legislative support for this idea. McKee said the law would "...propose regulatory controls on the purchase of firearms by first requiring a permit". The permit would require police screening of purchasers. Police Chief Jesse E. Curry supported the legislation along with the Ft. Worth and Houston Crime Commissions. They all were concerned about too many "...teen-age hoodlums" arming themselves too easily. Chief Curry was quoted as saying that as many as a hundred shootings could have been avoided if firearms had not been so easily available (Dallas Morning News, November 13, 1960). This approach to gun purchases did not gain popularity during McKee's life, it would only partly be implemented in Texas in the 1990s.

McKee proposed an area survey to determine how many police should be in Dallas based on the size of the area patrolled rather than the population,

this was previously suggested by the first Managing Director Dan Reynolds. McKee would continue to ask the commissioners' court to study whether a prison farm for Dallas County would be a useful addition to the criminal justice system. This idea would be suggested each year into the 1990s.

Nineteen sixty-one (1961) was a quieter year, partly because the overall crime index rates were down. McKee wrote that he believed that juvenile crimes were being handled better which helped with the crime reduction. He was pleased too, that DPD had recently added another 50 officers but argued more were needed for a positive force against crime in the city. The DCC was continuing to press for another court and were concerned too, that the County Grand Jury had publically criticized the District Attorney's Office for spending too much time as a bill collector for merchants' bad checks. The Grand Jury believed that local businesses should take more responsibility for avoiding check losses. This coincided with DCC programs.

By 1962 major crime was up 11% with Dallas ranked 5th for murders nationally. McKee blamed part of the problem on the lack of sufficient courts to try cases. At the same time he commended DA Wade for impaneling a second grand jury. He chose the 1962 Annual Report to criticize the state Bar's efforts to pass changes in the Criminal Code and urged its rejection. It would be passed by the state legislature but due to protest from the DCC and the state's district attorneys, would be vetoed by the governor (Annual Report, 1962).

There was concern too, about narcotics and gaming cases and the constant delays in prosecution. There had been a 33 1/2% increase in major crimes since 1959, even though there had only been an increase in population of 2.5%. Other areas examined by the DCC were private club complaints. Most of Dallas County did not allow the sale of liquor, to have drinking privileges, private clubs were licensed. Most complaints were about the unlicensed clubs since there were only 126 licensed and 150 unlicensed ones (Annual Report, 1962).

The DPD was still running about 100 officers short of its authorized manpower complement. A major reason for this was the complaint about police pay, base pay was \$317 per month take home. McKee said the city needed to abandon old civil service wages. Constant turnover of officers was costing the city due to the need for training of new policemen. If this were allowed to continue, the population should not be surprised at corruption. McKee said, more than once, that the residents get what they pay for, and salaries must be raised to improve motivation and insure continued integrity.

In 1964, the DCC was trying to obtain raises for the District Attorney and his staff (they were successful in 1965), at that time DA Henry Wade was handling both jobs of County and District Attorney for a salary of \$16,000.00.

McKee began to more publically criticize churches and homes for failing to provide moral leadership to stem the tide of rising crime. *He noted that the prison population was growing three times faster than the city's*

population, emphasis added. There is, he said, too much attention to material goods. He would continue this theme throughout his administration.

He led the DCC into providing literature to school libraries to aid students to understand police responsibilities. It was important for children to recognize policemen as their friend and not an enemy. The brochure in appendix D was typical of this type of commission document.

The budget for 1964 was \$20,814.15 with \$2,493.00 designated for investigations. In the annual report, he listed himself as the President and Managing Director for the first time since Bryce Alexander had resigned in 1958 (Annual Report, 1964).

In a letter to a private citizen, dated March 11, 1964, and signed by McKee, he discussed the DCC's role in the city. The letter was an apparent response to a request from the citizen. In the letter, McKee notes that the DCC maintains about 100,000 record cards on criminals regarding their offenses and the disposition of those offenses. This information is furnished to the commission by state and federal agencies and courts. He stated that citizens could call the commission and obtain all the information that is maintained on a job prospect or any other legitimate reason for needing the background information. (Note that this is nearly ten years before the first freedom of information and privacy act legislation which limited the release of law enforcement records).

McKee said in the letter, that the DCC had studied a Detroit juvenile policy that helped keep young people from receiving a juvenile criminal record. Previously,

if a juvenile was picked up by police, he or she was charged with “suspicion ” which was placed on their permanent record. As a result of the study, DCC had suggested that the Dallas PD change its policy. The Commission had encouraged the police to take the juvenile home and avoid having a stain on the youth’s file. DPD adopted the procedure. Generally, this policy continues today.

In 1965, McKee and the DCC launched another investigation into an alleged abuse of probation by the defense attorneys and the courts. The DCC asserted that many offenders were being given multiple probated sentences, allowing violent persons to walk the streets. The Commission wanted more of the arrestees given more jail time and fewer probated sentences. The Grand Jury publically criticized the report for inadequate information. They said the errors allowing what appeared to be more probated sentences, were usually caused by clerical blunders. The DBA had also criticized the report but they and the DCC subsequently agreed to work together to improve the efficiency of the probation department.

The remaining years of John McKee’s leadership of the DCC were colorful. Historically improved vision reveals a McKee continuing to spiral toward a more hyper-critical, dogmatic leadership style. There were bursts of ideas with beneficial suggestions mixed with more that were confusing. He routinely was quoted and wrote diatribes about society or of particular individuals and he periodically criticized the DPD, the Sheriff’s Office or the District Attorney.

McKee appeared before the Grand Jury, in 1965, to explain his public criticisms of the operation of the DPD. The Grand Jury adopted his recommendations that included a 24 hour operation of the Identification Bureau,

improvement of the writing of police reports and more pre-sentence conferences between the judges and prosecutors. These reasonable suggestions were followed by others that are confusing.

McKee criticized the on-going civil rights sit-ins and demonstrations as another example of the “moral decay” of the country. The demonstrations, in his view, reflected disloyalty to the country. One unexplained proposal was that the police and the criminal justice system should stop wasting time on cases that the grand jury will “no bill”. (If it is not investigated, how will the information be collected to provide to the grand jury?)

The DCC continued to promote positive ideas for children. They distributed 100,000 pamphlets for school children “Always be Careful” which outlined ways for children to avoid becoming victims of crime and taught them to trust policemen. Brochures and visits to schools by policemen and members of the Commission reinforced the positive message to school children.

He complained often about slanderous statements and charges made against his operation of the Commission but stated he would continue to recommend methods of crime prevention. McKee asked for a \$5000.00 increase in budget for the next year for additional studies and investigations. The total was \$24,324.87 with \$2500.00 for investigation, educational and crime prevention program

By 1966, McKee's annual reports were more strident, his annual report was somewhat rambling for 33 pages. Much of it written in a sermonizing fashion discussing all the people who were critical of his efforts to improve the criminal

justice system. He continued to blame most of the problems on church, family and school leadership.

Positive programs implemented during the later years included a change of the Public Forum to "Operation Concern". This was a program for 7-12 graders called "Operation On Guard" to provide instruction to help children recognize sex offenders and pornographers. They were taught self-defense tactics by the DPD. The Chairman of the Juvenile Committee, Harry Kaplan, developed a program to reduce juvenile crime through speeches to juvenile and adult groups in communities.

On the crime front, the DCC worked with law enforcement authorities through a commission informant and successfully prosecuted a forgery/prostitution ring. L.W. "Logan" Mayo Chairman of the Liquor Board Committee attended weekly protest meetings in Judge Sterrett's Court. These occurred when the DCC sent letter reports to the Judge's office, police, and Texas Liquor Control Board with the results of their records' search reflecting unfavorably on the applicant. If the prospective licensee opposed the denial, there was a hearing in the County Judge's Court.

By 1967 McKee's ideas for solving crime were more focused on major sociological issues. In a letter to a citizen he complained about the growing tendency to blame society for criminal acts. He cited sociological studies from England that suggested that it was the failure of environmental changes that might lower crime rates. His interpretation of the study was that better living conditions for criminals simply meant they were more comfortable while committing criminal acts.

McKee also blamed the church, for failing to provide moral leadership, the schools, for not instilling respect for the law, and parents, for not providing guidance for their children. In the same letter he did have specific recommendations. One was to create more reasons to attract policemen to law enforcement service (Annual Report, 1966).

In the last few years of his presidency McKee often made public statements that offended many Dallas leaders. These occurred when officials were not consulted prior to a media announcement from the Commission . An example occurred in 1968 when the DCC paid for a full page advertisement in each of the local newspapers, asking the schools what they were doing about the lack of school and police efforts to rid schools of drugs and prostitution. The DCC had hired an ex-FBI agent to investigate prostitution which had led him to uncover significant high school prostitution and drug activity. No one had been advised of the investigation prior to the newspaper ad. The report of teenage drug addiction and prostitution was widely publicized in Dallas. McKee suggested that there could be payoffs from the call-girl trade to persons from the local criminal justice agencies. A copy of the investigative report was not in the archives of the DCC to review (Dallas *Times Herald*, December 15, 1968).

McKee and the Commission launched a more popular program to bring more citizens into anti-crime efforts. The DCC proposed a petition to present to legislators and President Johnson to enact laws to protect and preserve the rights of individual citizens. They also wanted to recruit citizens into an “army” against the criminals.

The DCC appealed for help from churches, schools, and parents. The *Herald* editorial said this was the only way meaningful law enforcement could be achieved, through citizen action. A petition was organized, whether a letter was ever sent to the White House, could not be confirmed.

There was a direct conflict with the DBA and DCC over public coverage of trials. According to the DCC press statement, the ABA had issued a report that would attempt to reduce press coverage of trials and thus “muzzle” the press. The Dallas Criminal Bar Association urged the DCC to quit harassing effective law enforcement and get off its “virtuous high horse”. This public confrontation continued in the local newspapers until the ABA proposal was rejected by the legislature.

A local reporter used the incident to discuss the history of the DCC and particularly McKee’s ten years at the helm of the organization. The reporter pointed to the general perception that many local officials either despised or revered the DCC. Local police vice officers thought that McKee was “the man who cries wolf.”

City Councilwoman Sibyl Hamilton asked for McKee’s resignation but he announced that he would accept another 3-year term.⁴ The city council and school officials were critical that McKee announced the school drug and prostitution report before he discussed it with them. Hamilton said that McKee wants to pinpoint problems and make headlines but wants no part of the solution. One

⁴ Former council woman Sybil Hamilton who first publically called for McKee to resign died of cancer in 2000 aged 79. She was known to be very outspoken, forceful and with great compassion. In addition to her city council service she was also appointed to the EPA governing board by President Nixon.

particular aspect of the report was that McKee said that 70% of the school principals were not interested in his information about the use of drugs in the schools. When asked for proof, in a style reminiscent of Joseph McCarthy, McKee said “ Do you think I’d make a report that can’t be backed up? Now you’re questioning my integrity!” (Dallas Morning *News*, December 17, 1968).

McKee was adamant that organized crime was in Dallas often pointing to 100 fronts for gambling in the city. McKee said that if something is not done about it, *legitimate businesses will start losing money from them*, emphasis added.

He was angry about DPD’s problem with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panther Party (Black Panthers). This refers to the instances when major police departments throughout the United States were sued civilly by groups who suspected that law enforcement had illegally investigated their organization. He believed this indicated these groups disloyalty to the country (Annual Report, 1969-70).

The DCC began working with the police department on the “ Crime Stop Program”. This was a plan to educate citizens about suspicious activity and to help them work more closely with the department. It was often referred to as a crime stopper program but did in fact work toward involving citizens in simple crime prevention efforts such as locking their houses and cars and watching for suspicious people in their neighborhood.

Nineteen hundred seventy (1970) found the DCC attempting to gain an additional 400 policemen for DPD and to stop the cycle of repeat offenders. This

continued in the 1970-71 Annual Report which McKee submitted as a speech at the Annual Membership Meeting November 29, in the Junior Ballroom of Statler-Hilton. He recommended that police training be improved and that the base pay for policemen increase. Also, in a somewhat prophetic quote he said, "The year of 1972 is just around the corner and if there aren't (sic) some drastic changes made in our community, we are predicting that the crime rate will increase." He certainly was not expecting the "drastic changes" to be solely directed at him and to end his domination of the GDCC and his influence in Dallas. 1970 also marked the name change of the DCC to the Greater Dallas Crime Commission indicating the beginning of the commission's expansion outside of downtown Dallas.

The reporter that initially broke the story about McKee's fallacious conduct was Hugh Aynsworth of Newsweek, now of the *Washington Times*. His story detailed how McKee, believing he was near death, called a friend to his bedside. The friend was an Episcopal priest. During this encounter, lasting several days McKee revealed his true identity and some of his crimes. McKee recovered and then sought to have the priest driven out of the Masonic Order on moral's charges. The priest contacted an attorney and the press.

"Deposed McKee was city's Mr. Clean for more than decade" read the headline. After years of being the leading crime fighter in Dallas, McKee was discovered to be using an assumed name, James Kell Zullinger, who was a military deserter in 1929. He was also charged with embezzlement from the Scottish Rite organization. At the time of his downfall he was one of the highest ranking officials

in the state's Masonic Order. He would eventually receive a seven year probated sentence for his crime. The Masonic Order eventually sued him to collect the embezzled funds. An interesting side note is that McKee's military desertion was mute by 1972 since the Navy had declared Zollinger, his true identity, legally dead in 1951. Had it not been for the embezzlement, and his charges against the priest, he could have continued his career posing as McKee. (The expanded story of this remarkable event, including Aynesworth documenting a visit of "McKee" to his dead relatives, is recorded in his story written for *D Magazine*, August, 1983).

The Dallas Morning *News* ran a lengthy column detailing the follow-up immediately after the McKee scandal became public. R. L. Thornton, Jr. and other board members were quoted saying that the DCC might become even stronger now that it was not a one man organization. At the time of the story McKee had not resigned from the commission but the DCC had been suspended from the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions. The DCC staff consisted of an office manager, bookkeeper, and two stenographers. There were some suggestions that the DCC might not survive the McKee scandal partly because his public pronouncements had angered many city leaders. According to Ray Montgomery and Logan Mayo interviews in 1999, this was a serious concern. The records and Montgomery, who played a significant role in the Commission's revival, reflect that Mayo and Thornton were prime movers in the restoration of the GDCC as a force in Dallas.

Reorganization of the GDCC began almost immediately with the arrival of advisors from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to recommend changes. A 5-man committee of the Dallas Citizen's Council was assigned to work on organizational changes. This committee included Leo Corrigan Jr., Al Davies, Ben Lipshy, H.D. Schodde and Bill Seay. Representatives from other successful commissions also visited and conferred on operations. Interestingly, in two years, other cities would be inviting Mayo to speak to them about improving their Crime Commission and he would be elected to head the national group. Bob Thornton also announced that the NACC has reinstated the DCC and that the new local offices will be at 701 Mercantile Securities Building 1802 Main. At that time the DCC had approximately 1000 members and only one resigned after the McKee disgrace. Thornton reminded the press that the DCC and its director "has no more authority than the PTA." (Dallas Morning News, March 17, 1972).

R. L. Thornton, Jr. has to be considered, along with Logan Mayo and others, as a principal force in restoring the Greater Dallas Crime Commission. Despite growing up in the shadow of his father, he managed to succeed as a civic and business leader. In addition to his role with the GDCC, he was a banker, he helped create the Dallas County Community College, was on the board of Trustees of Texas Women's University, was trustee of the Texas Research Foundation, trustee of the Southwestern Medical Foundation, a member of the board of development of Dallas Baptist College and on the advisory council of Callier Speech and Hearing Center, a director of the State Fair of Texas, the American Cancer Society, Dallas

Historical Society, Greater Dallas Planning Council and the YMCA. There were many others. He died in 1992.

Membership figures seem to have been varied during this period since a year later Thornton stated the membership level was approaching 150. (This may have been the difference between the mailing list, individual and corporate members and those who had not paid the annual dues.) Thornton acknowledged that at one point during the past year the membership waned to 65.

Discussion

The story of McKee and his downfall was an embarrassment to Dallas and the GDCC. It could easily have been the end of a well-established organization. It would not have been too surprising had the Commission ended in 1972. What occurred was the realization that it was not a one-man organization, and never had been. The men, later the women, who took control after McKee were determined to restore the luster of the citizen's crime control body.

McKee's demise, also illustrates the problems that occur in volunteer organizations. It may often happen in non-criminal justice agencies but when it occurs in law enforcement related groups it tends to be of greater impact. Perhaps it demonstrates the need for professionals within the law enforcement community to be wary of depending on the help given by private agencies.

McKee became a convicted felon and was an impostor, but continues to have loyal supporters in Dallas many years after his death. Others support the changes he made while running the Crime Commission. Beyond these personal

views, an examination of his leadership reflects both positive and deleterious interpretations of the 1958-1972 period.

McKee was a self-made man, although it is hard to determine from this distance, which man. There is little known about the Zollinger identity, but the McKee persona rose from a line worker at the Ford plant to a senior executive there, the number two man in the Texas Shriners and the symbol for anti-crime efforts at the Dallas Crime Commission. Many of his programs were far-reaching and even progressive by today's standards. He advocated licencing of firearms, favored better education for inmates and tried to get legislation to seize the cars of drunk drivers, suspend or remove their license and force them to submit to blood test. At the same time he believed that persons who advocated liberal political positions were un-American and people who disagreed with him were anti-crime.

Perhaps, McKee fits into the category discussed earlier, that some people simply should not be allowed to participate in anti-crime groups, (Grabosky, 1992). Despite the vagueness of Grabosky's position, no one can control the participation of individuals who wish to indulge in crime commissions other than the commission. It is not likely they would even today reject someone with the abilities of a John McKee. At the time of his service he was despised and feared by many local leaders who seldom criticized his activities until after his public demise. His leadership in other areas were equally progressive.

McKee wanted local businesses to be responsible for their own safety and protection. He vehemently objected when he discovered the district attorney was

spending inordinate time collecting bad checks when he viewed this as a primary function of the businesses who failed to exercise caution when accepting checks. Much like a recent examination of police alternatives theories, private business, particularly insurance companies are beginning to adopt more positive actions toward anti-crime efforts. Often, it is to the insurance company's best interest to "persuade" clients to take on crime prevention activities that would tend to make the company less vulnerable to crime. Examples include better burglar alarms, more scrutiny of employees, private patrols, and other improvements that lowers the potential exposure of the insurance company which improves its profitability. It also enables the insured to pay lower rates to the insurance company (Roach et al, 2000).

Obviously, it is not always a win/win situation but it helps reduce the need for more police presence on the insured property. The essence of this theory is that as private interest realize that police cannot handle all criminal problems, it is up to the companies to take steps that reduce its criminal profile. The police have the authority of the state behind them and can and do often make demands on private industry to help themselves. This coercion has limits but the marketplace has authority that transcends state controls; i.e., profits. If the insurance company will not insure them, the client company may not exist. Thus, when the insurer demands changes, they usually happen quickly. In many cases the company's premium cost is reduced proportionally and it may have fewer crime problems.

The article is clearly accommodating of crime commission development since many of their members are and have been insurance company's executives who

wanted to develop programs that would reduce their companies' exposure to criminal losses. Crime control is thus transferred from the police to the marketplace. This represents a return of control from the traditional police representing a secondary authority to the "primary" control of the stakeholders. Through this means the insurance companies, for example, "... constrain the activities of actual or potential policyholders, and that are aimed at reducing criminogenic opportunities" (Roach et al,2000).

There has been a large increase in third party policing, particularly within the last decade. If this trend continues, the historical direction of the crime commission would be prescient in that they have often made strides toward the efficacy of businesses taking positive actions to reduce their crime exposure. They have often chided organizations to protect themselves. These initiatives include fingerprinting check writers, better identification, rape prevention counseling, protecting property and other crime prevention methods. Many of these initiatives began in the 1950s and continue today through commission committees and programs.

McKee could be viewed as a forerunner of this program. He represented a mixture of the positive and negative, and a conservative and liberal interpretation of anti-crime philosophy. Many historical figures are highly regarded in some areas and severely criticized in others. When he decided to try and protect his fraudulent existence, he ended his career in a deceptive cloud of his own design.

Chapter Four The Story Continues

No one likes starting over. But after the initial surprise and disappointment with the announcement of McKee's indictment and masquerade, a few members made it their business to continue the Commission, with new leadership and new organization guidelines.

The new administration of the Greater Dallas Crime Commission was a team effort. A \$20,000.00 consultant study paid for by the Citizen's Council, completed in 1972, recommended positive programs and the *termination of investigative activities*.⁵ It also recommended a permanent paid executive director. This position would not be implemented until 1986, partly due to funding problems. Logan Mayo, would become a largely unpaid Managing Director for about fifteen years. As funding became available he was given a minimal salary. Mayo said in a 1999 interview, that Bob Thornton told him the Commission would be able to pay for his parking if he took the job. Mayo had recently retired from Sears and would relish the job with the crime commission. Among the new leaders were R.L. Thornton, Jr., Maurice Acers, Clarence Talley, Logan Mayo, Ben Lipshy and W. R. Montgomery. Montgomery told the newspaper in 1972 that the GDCC would concentrate on

⁵ It is interesting that this was considered a priority since none of McKee's errors was related to the Commissions' investigations, but it was the area most criticized by those outside the Commission.

programs to support the police and cooperative efforts with other interested parties. Mayo told the same newspaper to examine the Commission's work with the Salvation Army to provide overnight housing for recently discharged prisoners, holding shoplifting seminars with the police, providing pamphlets in "Lock Your Car-Pocket your Key" programs and "Protect your Assets" program. GDCC also studied a venture in Florida called "The Seed" to provide drug treatment for teenagers. Talley had in fact traveled to Florida and New York ghettos to study drug problems and solutions for use in Dallas (*Dallas Morning News*, March 29, 1974).

By 1974 the membership was back to 167. Logan Mayo began to represent the newly reorganized GDCC, as its Managing Director. He made speeches around the city and the country. Eventually he would be elected president of the National Association of Citizen Crime Commissions with other cities asking him to visit to help them establish their commissions. During Mayo's years as the administrator of the GDCC, he would retain the title Managing Director. (McKee had been President and Managing Director) Thornton was President.

The GDCC became a supportive organization rather than one that conducted investigations or sought dramatic headlines. They would rarely publically criticize any of the existing agencies. A brief litany of their activities in the first years following McKee, reveals the effort and enthusiasm, the members put into Commission programs. They worked with the police to encourage citizens to mark their property, to help reduce burglaries. This program, called Big CIS (computer identification system) asked participating homeowners to mark their property with a metal engraving

tool. GDCC gave 200 electric engravers to the police to distribute to citizens. Later, the Boy Scouts of America, adopted parts of this program and volunteered to mark property for citizens who requested help (Dallas *Times Herald*, July 6, 1973).

GDCC started the Helping Hand Program to assist abused children or simply provide a safe-haven for children going or coming from school. The undertaking identified individuals and their homes along routes used by school children; these homes were given decals which allowed youngsters to recognize the residence as a safe haven if they feared for their safety.

The “Lock your Car and Pocket the Key” approach operated successfully for years. In 1972 the Commission had distributed 10,000 circulars to encourage this simple but effective idea, alarms for cars and automatic locks and remote access were not common in 1974.

By May of 1973 “En-Garde” was the new name of the GDCC newsletter. The new officers were: President R. L. Thornton, Jr.; committee chairman included the Research Causes and Prevention of Crime Committee, George Jalonick; the Juvenile Committee, George Dehl; the Enforcement Committee, Laurence Melton; the Membership Committee, Sam Wiener; the Financial Committee W. Ray Montgomery; the Drug Abuse Committee, Clarence Talley; the Publicity for the Commission was led by Al Garrett; the Planing Committee, Charles E. Watson; Russell Perry headed the Legislature Committee. He would subsequently replace Thornton as President (“En-Garde”, May 1, 1973).

Meanwhile, McKee was sued by the Scottish Rite Dallas Lodge of Perfection for \$119,535.00. They asked for an accounting for the loss from 1968-1972. A final settlement could not be located. By 1975 McKee, 69, was working as a cashier at the Hartford Building parking lot and claiming to be writing a book to tell his side of the story. Apparently, it was never completed.

The GDCC began to seek more minority members. One 1950 board member stated in a 1974 news article, that the DCC needed to increase the scope of its members to include females, members of ethnic groups and a "balance" from the community (Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).

GDCC selected an annual meeting speaker who was able to replace some luster lost after the McKee demise. John McKissick remembered in 1999, that working on the preparation for California's Governor Ronald Reagan's 1974 visit as one of the highlights of his early years in the Commission. Governor Reagan was beginning to be seen as a national figure.

The GDCC sought and attracted other prominent speakers from the earliest days to today. Estes Kefauver was a speaker in the first year of the Commission, Governor Alan Shivers, Janet Reno, Jesse Jackson, Bill Clements and almost any state official were regularly brought in as guest of the Commission. The respect held for the membership and its influence, was a major reason speakers wanted to visit the GDCC.

California Governor Ronald Reagan was the star of the 1974 annual meeting and gave the DCC much needed local prestige after the destruction left by the

McKee scandal. It would take several years however, before the Commission would be operating on a sound financial basis. (Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).

The GDCC worked more closely with law enforcement agencies. They cooperated with District Attorney Wade on legislative changes to more easily revoke bail and to allow appeals from pre-trial judicial decisions. Commission leadership sought changes in the state law applied to search warrants, oral confessions and electronic surveillance. They continued to emphasize the need for more courts, the number of judges available for appeals and streamlining appellate procedures. The Bail Bond Committee, chaired by Maurice Acers, for nearly fifteen years, suggested an audit of the Sheriff's Bail Bond section and possible legislative changes. The Legislative Committee led by Russell E. Perry promoted a constitutional amendment to permit denial of bond to repeat offenders, to allow police to use oral confessions, to provide for a summary procedure for destruction of contraband, narcotics and drugs seized by law enforcement, and a statute prohibiting enticement of juveniles into vehicles or other structures for immoral purposes (Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).

The Law Enforcement Committee met with the Dallas Police Department and encouraged them to train women officers to interview female rape victims, and the idea was accepted. Joe Balisteri of the Youth Committee, worked through established groups to encourage efforts in youth development programs since "...fighting crime without equal emphasis on delinquency prevention may be

likened to the frustration of swatting mosquitoes while failing to put oil on the brood pond.” (Annual Report ,1974).

Logan Mayo reported on efforts to start up programs to obtain citizen participation in projects such as the Neighbor-Help-Neighbor (eventually Neighborhood Watch Programs) and a Women Against Crime group. There was also a report by Mrs. Charles L. Vychopen on the need for a court observer program. Mrs. Vychopen was one of the first female members of the GDCC along with Ebby Holiday.

By December 31, 1974 there were 167 active members, both corporate and private memberships. The number does not include the hundreds of others on a mailing list who are at least partly active through meetings and committees, many of these are from the law enforcement population.

Russell Perry was named to head the GDCC in 1976. Perry, was the board chairman and CEO of Republic Financial Services Inc. Also elected was Maurice Acers, Joe F. Balisteri Jr., W. Ray Montgomery treasurer, George S. Nicoud Jr., and Logan W. Mayo continued as Managing Director (under the new changes the title was Executive Director but this title was not used until Greg MacAleese arrived in 1986).

The years immediately after McKee resigned were critical for the GDCC. Members were not ready to “fold their tent”. On the contrary, based on the events highlighted above, it was one of the busiest periods of Commission history.

Members were motivated to ensure the GDCC did not close . Events and activities mentioned above are only a sample of the work.

Successes are made up of small details, that work, and some little things began to happen that contributed to the Commission's survival. An editorial in the *Herald* in 1975 favored the idea of offering a reward for information leading to the arrest of murderers. It had been implemented by 3,000 merchants and helped solve a double homicide. It was now being formalized through the new Greater Dallas Crime Council. They announced a \$5,000.00 reward for a robbery/murder in Irving. Informants could call a number and use a number or code name to identify themselves thus maintaining anonymity, a core requirement for the program's success (Dallas *Times Herald*, January 17, 1974). This was not a part of the GDCC or Crime Stoppers, but certainly indicated the community support for such a program. It would eventually become a major program of the GDCC. The "official" Crime Stoppers was at this time in its infancy in Albuquerque, New Mexico, led by a young policeman named Greg MacAleese.

Over the next few years the GDCC pressed ahead with efforts to actively involve more citizens in criminal justice issues. Lawrence Melton of the Law Enforcement Committee relayed police citizen information that resulted in the solving of an auto theft ring, shoplifting and house theft cases. He and John A. Hammack passed citizen information to the police that uncovered a juvenile gang engaged in breaking and entering in Oak Cliff. This committee also gave out 10,000 leaflets encouraging school achievement and reasons for kids to stay in school.

The Drug Abuse Committee set up a continuing drug abuse seminar for young people that met once per week. They also arranged for the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) to send three young male inmates to speak to school groups. The inmate visitation program continued for many years. Prisoners' speeches to young people were used to motivate and encourage juveniles to stay in school and off drugs; to avoid the mistakes they had made that led to their imprisonment.

Cecil Mills led the Rape Prevention Committee in activities that would grow and evolve for many years. At one time it was also called the Rape Committee, its name and focus would unfold over the years. His committee met with women's groups and distributed alarm whistles that women could use to signal alarm if they were in danger. They met with the Rape Crisis Center to ensure women who needed their help could do so. The Commission also purchased a film on rape prevention to loan to interested groups. They presented programs for women with the DPD and they scheduled informational and educational programs for women in real estate. They also worked with the Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs in educating and distributing the defense whistles. They analyzed the causes of rapes, and solicited public service time for media spot announcements. They worked with apartment owners on training conferences. They were investigating the scheduling of programs of self-protection for high school and junior high school girls and to advise parents how to recognize sexual abuse in their children. This GDCC program was presented to the National Association of Citizen Crime Commissions, meeting in Philadelphia, where it was adopted by several other commissions.

The Operation Identification Committee, involving the permanent marking of all personal property held considerable local interest and the committee members appeared on television and made speeches to encourage citizens to participate.

The Committee on Causes and Prevention of Crime successfully brought about use of the Woodlawn Hospital as a minimum security jail facility. It took three years and the support of Sheriff Clarence Jones and County Judge John Whittington before it was approved by U.S. District Judge Sarah Hughes. The Commissioners' Court appropriated \$400,000.00 for its renovation.

Commission legislative proposals included: 1. Revocation of bail for repeat offenders. 2. Making oral confessions admissible, Texas law did not allow oral confessions except in specific situations. 3. Elimination of unreasonable delay in courts, this revision would revise the speedy trial provisions. 4. Amendments to Juvenile laws to allow law enforcement officers to question minors. 5. Evidence obtained through search warrants, later found to be improper should be allowed in Texas when the officers were acting in "good faith"(Summer 1989, *The Informant*).

Maurice Acers, the new President of the GDCC forecasted and was rewarded with a decrease in crime for Dallas. He credited the decrease in crime to programs initiated under his administration. These initiatives included,

1.Organizing the North Texas Coordinating Council of Law Enforcement. This organization became a valuable communications link for police agencies in the region. 2. He and the Commission promoted the idea of Crimestoppers, this version addressed efforts to encourage the public toward self-protective measures eg. Lock your garage doors, lock your doors and windows. He was active in keeping the

local media aware of GDCC programs to keep the ideas in front of public; 3. New billboards paid for by the Independent Insurance Agents of Dallas with anti-theft messages; 4. Added 25 new members to the GDCC; 5. An Anti-dropout program that furnished 40,000 anti-drop out leaflets distributed in Dallas, Garland, Richardson, Mesquite, Plano, Rockwall and Royce City funded by DeGolyer and MacNaughton; 6. the GDCC worked on anti-crime legislation for the state legislature; 7. The GDCC helped the sheriff with bail bonds by asking for and obtaining over 200 volunteers, many retired FBI agents, to help with the back-log of paperwork; 8. GDCC also helped obtain development of the old Parkland Hospital to serve as a minimum security detention center.

Acers was a former Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1934-1947. He was born in Dallas in 1907 and received his Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1929 from SMU and his Juris Doctor from the University of Texas. He devoted most of his business attention to Acers Investments and Ebby Halliday Realtors. He was elected Chairman of GDCC in 1977. The late Mr. Acers was the husband of current Commission member, Ebby Halliday (1999 interview with Ebby Halliday; 1977-1979 Annual Reports).

The following was a partial list of GDCC on-going programs during the last years of the 1970s: 1. Lock your Car and Pocket the Key; 2. Helping Hand; 3. Lock your Home; 4. On Guard for Schools; 5. Operation Identification; 6. This is your crime commission brochure which encouraged citizen membership and participation in the Commission; 7. Swindle Protection for Senior citizens; 8. Protect your Business; 9. Defense Whistles for Women; 10. Drug and gun

destruction; 11. Citizen Block Partnership; 12. Rape Prevention/Self Protection Tips; 13. Membership in the Dallas Alliance and Council of Governments; 14. GDCC served as an advisor to citizens, churches, schools, and civic groups on crime prevention; 15. Membership in the NACCC.

Managing Director Logan Mayo became the Commission's representative at national commission functions and continued his work with Senior Citizens. He remained an ongoing speaker at Senior functions for nearly twenty years. He also presented and arranged for programs in churches with current inmates. By the 1990s, the Commission had established a Logan Mayo Award to symbolize an individual's devotion to crime commission efforts.

The Spring 1977 newsletter was called "Crimestopper". In Vol 1 No 1 it discussed the 500 people who attended the annual GDCC membership session. The number in attendance reflected the popularity and support given the Commission.

1977 reflected the continued strength of the GDCC by attracting popular and influential speakers. The 1977 Annual Luncheon was entertained by the State's Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby and the Speaker of the House Bill Clayton. The topic of discussion was a controversial wiretap law to allow state law enforcement to use wiretaps in narcotic's cases. Hobby was opposed to the wiretap law which was endorsed by the Commission and Governor Dolph Briscoe while Clayton gave it a lukewarm endorsement. Allowing opposing views was a common thread of Commission programs. The law was ultimately approved by the governor.

In 1978 the Texas Research League touted the GDCC as a model of how citizens can fight crime. The city of Dallas was enjoying a decrease in serious crime. However, according to Cecil Mills, rapes were continuing to increase in the city. The chairman of the renamed, Rape Prevention Committee, noted that Dallas was ranked first in the nation in per capita rapes. It was believed the increase was caused by more opportunity since more women were out alone at night, more live alone, more travel alone. He promised to continue working with women groups to improve this statistic. GDCC theories about the rape increases changed too.

The next year, 1979, the new GDCC President, John A. Hammack, wanted to develop programs that would target adults and young people. Hammack hoped to change the apathy of adults by getting them involved in Commission programs. He believed the outlook of teenagers could be changed through youth development initiatives and the drug abuse committee. Hammack obtained a charter for the "100 club of Dallas", which is a nationwide charitable organization dedicated to supporting local police. The GDCC hosted a national NACCC meeting where Mayo was elected the national president. This was only seven years after the Dallas Commission had lost its membership in the national group.

The GDCC also distributed a new drug abuse pamphlet in 1979, this one updated the current data about drug use. The Parole Committee continued working with the Wayback House through fund-raising, and assisting the Red Cross to help recently released inmates. The Wayback House supporters reported that offenders

who use the facility are less likely to be repeat offenders. Wayback House continues to operate in 2000.

1980-1990

1980's President Garland Neal announced that there had been a 13% increase in crime nationally. Dallas was not the only city with high crime rate but it certainly was a "national embarrassment". Trying to draw attention to the issue of high crime, the GDCC arranged a press conference in Austin to announce support of Governor Clement's anti-crime package. Unfortunately, the press release was over shadowed by what was referred to as "the tragedy in Washington, D. C.", the assassination attempt against President Reagan (Annual Report, 1980).

In 1981, the Commission held an appreciation luncheon for Governor Bill Clements who was recognized as the Law Enforcement Man of the Year, a major GDCC award. Shortly after his speech, the GDCC received a letter from the governor, thanking them for their support of the anti-crime/drug package. Fourteen of sixteen measures were passed by 67th Legislature including many that the GDCC had been supporting for years.

The Commission did begin to draw notice to crime issues later in 1980. One, was the beginning of the showing of the Crime Stopper program on Ch. 8 (WFAA)

television which continues today. It enlisted public support to solve crimes through re-enactment of the crimes.

A major event occurred in 1986 when the four major anti-crime programs in Dallas, merged with GDDC, CrimeStoppers, the 100 Club and the Friends of the Dallas Police Department. The merger meant that only one group would be soliciting funds and there would be a cohesive organizational structure.

A new newsletter was unveiled at the 1987 dinner, it was called "The Informant". In it was reported that Crime Stoppers had led to the solution of 450 cases in 1987 and recovered \$1.6 Million in property and narcotics. The Auto Theft Alert Program had asked local radio stations to broadcast descriptions of stolen autos. This led to the recovery of 208 of 285 cars reported stolen and announced on cooperating stations KMGC, Q-102 and KKDA.

Another public event was *Crime Watch '88*, an exposition sponsored by the GDCC was designed to alert citizens to methods of crime prevention at home and business. John Walsh, host of "America's Most Wanted" television program, was the keynote speaker at the "Forum on Crime". The program and the exposition was free to the public.

MacAleese, the new executive director as of 1986, told the executive committee, in 1989, that funding was not complete for the production of "Crackdown" and it may not go on time. This was a major public event. Crackdown was an hour length video that reflected the violence and human loss caused by the

illegal drug trade. MacAleese was planning to show "Crackdown" in January 1990 with television channels 4,5,8 and Spanish station 23 simultaneously broadcasting the show, and with newspaper and radio saturation on the same day. They had received more funding from American Airlines, Domino Pizza and the Perot Foundation. He was promoting the possibility of a cocktail party by Ft. Worth and Dallas Mayors for the final funding of the production. In an interview in 1999, MacAleese described this period as one of the most tense of his life. He said when he received word of the final amount of funding, at Christmas, it was one of his most treasured presents.

GDCC continued to press for its legislative agenda, some local and others for statewide consideration. City Councilman Rolan Tucker asked for their help to eliminate the name of those with burglar alarms from the Open Records's Act's requirement that would identify homeowners with alarms which would help burglars develop their targets. The Legislative Committee was working with the Mayor's Task Force's on an anti-crime package preparing for the 70th Legislature. The proposed legislative agenda included one that would increase the amount of time served for certain offenses such as murder, assault on law enforcement officials, injury to a child or an elderly person, retaliation crimes or organized crime. New laws proposed, addressed terrorist attacks, greater prosecution of both parties for lewdness offenses, and would make possession of obscene photos of children a criminal offense. Expansion of prisons was a priority and legislative

changes would require inmates to pay for damage to state property. The Commission studied the feasibility of the use of house arrest and whether better educational opportunities for inmates should be offered by state prisons (Annual Report, 1985). The Legislative Committee proposed and successfully obtained the passage, in the 1987 session of: 1. Juvenile Certification/Juvenile Records changes; 2. Prison Reform-Good Time Law, 3. Joinder of Offenses; 4. Controlled substance/Precursor Drugs; 5. Exclusionary Rule changes; 6. Civilian Insurance Inspectors; 7. State's Equal Access in Appeals; and the 8. Streamlined Effects of Appeals Reversals. The GDCC also supported legislation to expand TDC by 10,000 beds but the legislature only approved 6,000. The failures in this session included the refusal to allow oral confessions and the legislature refused to pass racketeering in corrupt organizations (RICO) legislation that would allow seizure of illegally gained profits. A provision that required probationers to pay into Crime Stopper fund, was discontinued. It was restored in the next session (Annual Report, 1987).

This report described how the members of the Parole Committee, tried to help ex-offenders with education and individual guidance. One inmate completed 241 courses in 31 months and was now employed full-time while another became a preacher. The committee's work reported over 400 correspondence courses and many trips to detention facilities.

In 1989, an 18-point Criminal Justice Reform Package was presented at the 71st legislative session, of these, 11 passed and two were to be considered in the special session.

By the 1988 annual membership meeting the focus was on expansion of the state prison system. During the program, speakers on opposing sides of this issue were given equal time. It reflected GDCC's desire to hear both sides of controversial issues. (Commission Memo, October, 1988 and Award Luncheon Program).

Cecil Mills Rape Prevention Committee reported that Dallas had 1200 rapes in 1980. The committee's operational theory had shifted to the idea that "women have a right to go anywhere they wish" without fear; that the motivation of rapist was power and anger, not sex (Annual Report, 1980). By 1987, the newly named Crimes Against Women Committee worked with the DPD's Child Sexual Exploitation Task Force, printed and distributed bumper stickers urging people to call with information about sex crimes involving children, held a forum on family violence and reviewed treatment programs for sex crime offenders and the impact of pornography on citizens in Dallas county (Annual Report, 1987).

Bail and probation changes have always been a priority of GDCC. In the 1980s, Maurice Acers continued his work on the Sheriff's bail bond and warrant problem. Acer's Bail Bond and Warrant's Committee discussed with the Sheriff the idea of the newspapers printing all the names of wanted persons. After examination

of some legal issues they agreed that the Sheriff would select ten and later twelve of the most wanted felons. The \$2000.00 fee was borne by the GDCC. Citizen participation was almost immediately successful in locating many of the fugitives. A variation of this idea continues today.

MacAleese reported in September 1, 1987 that a study by the DA's office demonstrated that 1,918 defendants were tried with 1,455 convicted. More than 1,000 received sentences of probation or less than one year in jail. 381 offenders were sentenced to TDC for an average time of 12.7 years. During this time TDC released 497 parolees to Dallas County. Thus Dallas gained 116 convicted felons during the period.

Part of the causes of the probation sentences was related to the needs of a new jail. The Commission's Jail Capacity Committee, at city council's request, researched the needs of the jail. It reported to the council that there was a need for an additional 2400 jail beds. Paul Spain, committee chairman disclosed that "We agree that the socioeconomic causes of crime must be studied and, if possible, solved. However, we also believe that a convicted criminal must serve his term." When he presented the Jail Capacity Committee report to the Dallas County Commissioners' Court in July it was severely criticized as "irresponsible" by some but most were courteous and generally supportive of the call for more beds. However, a few years later, the county's own study would agree with that of the GDCC.

GDCC has continuously been involved in anti-drug efforts. The Drug Abuse Committee arranged the visit of inmates to schools through the Inmate Visitation Program, raised money to purchase five pair of wide-angle binoculars for the Narcotics Division and were briefed by Phil Jordan on Drug Task Force work. Jordan, was the Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Agency, he asked the Commission for help in securing state legislation to prohibit the sale of chemical components to individuals that were used to make the methamphetamine drug "speed". This committee worked with other agencies: Dallas Challenge (truants), Dallas Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse; Associated Texans Against Crime (ATAC), Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Mayor's Task Force on Drug Abuse.

On January 18,1989 the Commission discussed and adopted a position paper that outlined its opposition to the legalization of drugs. Among the reasons specified was their belief that legalization was a quick fix and that proponents were doing a disservice to drug abusers because many would not seek treatment if they believe that their drug activity would soon be legal. It further emphasized that today's drugs were more potent and addictive so that first-time users were more likely to be addicted and even proponents admit that legalization would increase the number of users and the failure rate of "cures" are very low. The paper maintained that no one knew the genetic effects of drug use and legalization would damage the nation's work force.

A major highlight of the decade was the appearance of U.S. Senator Phil Gramm. The 1985 Annual Meeting was held April 11, 1985 with guest speaker Senator Phil Gramm. 750 people were in attendance at the Hilton Hotel (Crimestoppers, 1985).

The Commission continued its support of the local police. The Law Enforcement Liaison Committee (LEL) was created in June, 1987. Its primary focus was to provide funding for training for law enforcement agencies. DPD had a need for advanced in-service training. The GDCC agreed to fully fund the first years' training and one-half the cost in the second year. They subsequently, persuaded the city council to take over supplemental training costs. The type of training encouraged by the Commission was to train police to train others in their department.

Commission support often included public statements such as the one in 1988 for Dallas Chief of Police Billy Prince who was given a vote of confidence by GDCC after the Dallas Police Association voted no confidence. The GDCC vote was 188 for Prince with 21 voting no confidence and 14 abstaining. The vote received wide press coverage. It was taken after the Etta Mae Collins shootings that led to firing of Officer Mark Krause. This was a rare occasion when the GDCC made a partisan political statement.

1988 was a bloody year for the Dallas Police with several controversial police/minority shootings and six Dallas area policemen killed. These tragedies led

Dallas Mayor Annette Strauss to form an Advisory Committee on Crime. The GDCC was well-represented on the committee. The Advisory Committee submitted recommendations to the City Council which accepted most of them. One that did not receive wide-spread support was a controversial one that advocated strengthening the Police Review Board. Another recommended that DPD increase the number of minority police supervisors. GDCC would eventually publically oppose the strengthening of the Police Review Board.

Internally, the GDCC grew in size and adopted some administrative changes. Greg MacAleese became executive director in 1986. He was the founder of the first crime stoppers program in Albuquerque, N.M. and founder of Crime Stoppers International. He is the son of a former Canadian law enforcement official. MacAleese became an Albuquerque policeman and in 1974, along with an associate, started the Crime Stopper program. He eventually was assigned to the New Mexico governor's office to coordinate a state-wide version of the program. Shortly afterwards he was assigned to Texas Governor Mark White's staff to help organize a state-wide program here. He continued as an Albuquerque policeman until he came to Dallas. In 1986 he was given the job of Executive Director of the GDCC and the Dallas Crime Stopper's Program (Dallas Morning News, December 6, 1986 and MacAleese interview, 1999)

Established programs continued to operate including Carole Young's Crime Prevention Committee that implemented the Mobile and Business Crime Watch

This program trained taxi drivers and utility service employees, who had two-way radios, to aid police whenever they encountered criminal activity (Annual Report , 1987). The Crimes Against the Elderly Committee spent its time educating older citizens about home and auto safety, rape prevention and even protection of their purses. The committee and Mr. Mayo were widely known for their speeches at senior citizens facilities well into the 1990s. The Crime Victims Committee compiled and published a handbook for victims. It provided a list of victim rights under the law, how the criminal justice process operates, telephone numbers of agencies to aid victim and much additional valuable data. It may have been the first Dallas crime victim's handbook. (Annual Report, 1987)

The annual awards dinner named Charlie Terrell as the recipient of the "Crime Fighter of the Year" award for 1987 . He was selected because of his wide-ranging involvement in crime prevention efforts. He was Chairman of Mayor Starke Taylor's Criminal Justice Task Force; Chairman of Mayor Anette Strauss' Advisory Committee on Crime, Chairman, Governor Clement's Texas Criminal Justice Task Force, and Vice Chairman of Texas Department of Corrections.

On January 9, 1989 Lou Robinson called a meeting for the restructuring of GDCC. It is important, said Robinson, that the GDCC officers and committees follow the By-Laws, and focus on the *Life Cycle of Crime* (emphasis added) only. The life cycle of crime referred to, prevention, law enforcement, judiciary,

incarceration and rehabilitation. This marked the first broad changes in the administration of the GDCC since the end of the John McKee era.

During the decade Michaux Nash Jr., a banker, was elected president in 1983. During his term a series of significant events occurred including: 1.) the growth in popularity of Block Watch, during 1984 there were 244 organized groups and 136 in the process of organizing; on one occasion the Commission was asked to help supplement the funding needed for organizing the Block Watches, by the DPD.

Membership in the commission had increased to 323 as a new President, Cecil Mills, of Mills Investments, was installed in 1983. President John McKissick was elected President of the GDCC in 1986, David Dean, an attorney, was Chairman in 1986 but resigned, due to business concerns in 1988. He was replaced by Southwestern Bell executive LaRue Robinson.

Other highlights of 1989 included the Executive Committee discussion of a legislative bill that would provide \$3.00 per bond for criminal justice oriented grants, such as Crime Stoppers. It was suggested that the Commission liaison with the judges, probably through a luncheon since the judges had some discretion in this levy. Paul Spain discussed the recent Jail-a-thon at Valley View Mall that had netted pledges amounting to about \$78,000. Also in 1989, Robinson resigned as Chairman and was replaced by John McKissick with Nathan Maier as President. The decade of the 1980s ended on positive notes for most of Commission's

programs and events. It provided a base for their launch into the 1990s, the last period of this review.

1990-2000

Between 1990 and 2000, the GDCC continued and expanded its programs and even added some new ones. This period illustrates the flexibility and continued influence of the Commission. It would be led by a Coca Cola executive, two lawyers, an engineer and a retired FBI executive. Each would leave their personal mark on the GDCC and the organization would continue its growth as a leading civilian criminal justice agency.

Mary Poss promoted a new Crime Causes committee that would eventually include 42 citizens with time and resources to commit including people from DISD, DPD, the District Attorney and the Sheriff's office. It would attempt to present a "blue print" of what should be done to reduce crime in the area. In May, 1990 Mary Poss was selected Executive Director of GDCC replacing MacAleese who resigned to form a private company to produce anti-crime programs. When interviewed in Albuquerque in 1999, MacAleese indicated he made an additional eleven Crackdown videos from San Antonio to Canada, he also served as Chairman of Crime Stoppers International until 1996. During this time his wife and father died in consecutive years and he moved to Albuquerque to help care for his mother. He

is now President of Law Enforcement Technologies, Inc., which among other missions designs defensive and non-lethal equipment for law enforcement. Mary Poss was active in volunteer and civic affairs in Dallas for many years. Prior to these endeavors she worked at Interfirst Bank of Dallas. She is currently a member of the Dallas City Council and continues as an active supporter of GDCC.

John McKissick stressed his belief that the GDCC needed to focus on certain programs and disregard others since it cannot be everything to everyone. He said that “no one should ever use the name of the GDCC, or their affiliation with this organization, to endorse any political candidate, ever”. He reiterated this in a 1999 interview. His position may have guided the decision when Sheriff Bowles asked for help on art work for the front of the Frank Crowley Courts Building. The executive committee decided to offer vocal support only, Mary Poss volunteered to coordinate an effort to solicit \$250,000 but with no funds from GDCC.

The video “Crackdown” was to be broadcast for a January 23 air date. Mr. McKissick reviewed the rough cut well in advance of the air date. (McKissick recalled in a 1999 interview how onerous this job was for him. He noted that the videos from South America of shootings and bombings were very bloody and left nothing to the imagination.) A draft copy of the contract for “Crackdown” signed by Robinson and MacAleese provided some editorial control for the production. If

McKissick did not agree with the final cut then GDCC would have been removed from any credits for production.

The programs of the GDCC were reaching out to more and more people. In 1990, the Dallas Morning *News* conducted a survey to determine how many residents had heard of the Commission and where they had heard of it. The poll reflected that in January-February of 1990 over 2.5 million citizens were aware of the GDCC through radio and club announcements, but 1.9 million had heard of it through the Texas "Crackdown" broadcast on television

Support for the area's law enforcement agencies continued to be a core of the Commissions' philosophy. In 1990, the Law Enforcement Liaison Committee received all funds from the Hackberry Creek Country Club golf/tennis tournament who had donated its use of the club. The funds from the golf tournament were, used to support GDCC programs, usually police training.

GDCC was also supplementing training budgets for law enforcement. It provided DPD with \$30,000 (most of this money raised by the annual golf tournament). GDCC provided wanted felon photos, and re-enactments for television Channel 8, WFAA. In addition to paying money to victim officers survivors, they also arranged for the travel of the officer's families from out of town to come to Dallas for the funerals of officers killed in the line of duty (Dallas *Times Herald*, May 19, 1988). Training and assistance to law enforcement remained a high priority.

GDCC's Law Enforcement Liaison Committee had arranged for over \$70,000.00 in training funds for law enforcement agencies in one year. They also provided much needed equipment not funded by the agencies. The Auto Theft Committee provided support and arranged funding for the DPD's auto theft unit, most recently giving that group a computer system to help reduce auto thefts.

GDCC avoids the label of lobbyist. The Commission does attempt to include its agenda whenever possible and to use its members in influential organizations. The Commission's political efforts are reflected in the numerous laws and legal initiatives in the state of Texas.

GDCC was often called upon by Dallas area political leaders. In 1992 they were actively supporting MUSCLE- Mayors United on Safety, Crime and Law Enforcement which was an association of Texas mayors working together on issues affecting crime. Later, the Dallas mayor's office called on the GDCC for help in winning one of the proposed new state prisons for Dallas. In 1993, Mayor Steve Bartlett asked for the GDCC to review the current use of the county jail and help get agreement on priorities between the county judges, and prosecutors.

GDCC speakers indicate the high regard most political leaders place in the Commission. One appearance, likely caused a reversal of election fortunes. The 40th awards luncheon provided a taste of notoriety at a GDCC sponsored meeting at which both Ann Richards and Clayton Williams (candidates for governor of Texas) were speakers. Prior to the speeches Williams refused to shake her hand and

publically called her a liar. Many people believe that his ungentlemanly behavior caused Williams to lose the election. This event took place 26 days before the election and Williams was leading the polls at the time.

In 1994, Reverend Jesse Jackson's keynote address at the fall luncheon told over 500 guests that people must focus on young people to keep them out of the criminal justice system rather than simply building more prisons. He said it is better to spend scarce dollars to help children grow up with better morals and character than to add more prison beds and worry about rehabilitation later. Reverend Jackson received a standing ovation and the luncheon raised over \$30,000.00 for the Commission.

1996 was likely remembered for the keynote address of Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating. This summer luncheon recognized his achievements since becoming its governor. His leadership after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building was exemplary and helped citizens recover from the devastating deaths and injuries.

Shortly, after Buck Revell became Chairman of the GDCC, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani spoke at the 1999 Spring Awards Luncheon. Nearly 800 people heard him describe his anti-crime agenda. His speech was carried live nationally by C-SPAN. Giuliani's appearance was sponsored by the GDCC with the cooperation of the Rotary Club of Dallas, the Dallas Press Club and the Dallas Council on World Affairs.

GDCC also hosted a Texas Summit by the National Commission on Model State Drug Laws at the Adolphus Hotel and was addressed by House Judiciary chairman Henry Hyde and Texas Attorney General Dan Morales. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Attorney General Dan Morales, Mayor Ron Kirk, USA Paul Coggins and GDCC leadership discussed the changes needed in drug laws. Sessions at the conference included prevention and treatment programs. It is plain that GDCC can exercise political influence.

It is difficult to determine if GDCC's political power is as important as its emphasis on youth development and other juvenile intervention. The 1990s reflect a major effort by the GDCC to spread its impact into youth programs. In the first few years of the 1990s the Youth Crimes Committee (YCC) distributed over 1.1million football cards and its Youth Essay Contest received 788 essays with the winners receiving about \$5,500.00 in prizes. Each first place winner received \$25.00 and a signed Nolan Ryan baseball. Crime Stoppers was also trying to implement a youth crime stopper program in the schools by studying a similar program in schools in Dade County, Florida they planned to bring into DISD. YCC was also growing, it had created a new program called "Cruising In the Right Lane" that honors young people each month for doing well in school and rewards their community involvement. It was for age groups 6-12 and 12-16 who were rewarded for making good decisions. The YCC was also working with the Boy Scouts to organize troops in neighborhoods where parents are

unobtainable for varying reasons. The Youth Crime Council was in over 20 DISD high schools who meet monthly to discuss youth crime problems and prevention, looking at peer mediation and organizing positive extra-curricular activities (Today, the YCC is in all DISD high schools.)

In August, 1993, GDCC officials met with leaders from area churches, businesses, chambers of commerce and DISD to plan future priorities of the Crime Commission. Youth crime was the most common concern of all the groups who agreed it must be the top priority. Work on prevention efforts and providing positive alternatives for youth was critical for the future success of the commission. The Commission was working with DISD to develop a school for expelled youth, it was the role of the crime commission to obtain support from foundations and corporations for this DISD effort.

GDCC began a Teen Fest in April, 1994 which would showcase bands and celebrities and food to bring out the youth. They would make available information on gang intervention and anti-drug information. Teenfest continued to grow with crowds of over 500.

On August 18, 1994, Elmer Murphey, III announced he had filed an assumed name document on August 17, 1994 for the Better Kids, Better Dallas (BKBD) program. The kick-off campaign was at the Anita Martinez Recreation Center on August 23, 1994 (seed money for this program was donated by Dr. Bob Smith and directed by Donna Halstead.) Essentially, the program encourages

young people to sign a “contract” with a policeman to improve their school grades. The BKBD provides awards and scholarships to deserving “kids”. BKBD’s fifth anniversary celebrated by creating a permanent endowment to ensure the future stability of the program. They established a Law Enforcement Explorer Scholarship program for future DPD applicants.

By 1997, GDCC youth programs reached 20,000 young people from lower elementary schools to college. Crime Stoppers programs reached into 10 additional high schools and middle schools. It is today very active in most suburban schools but is not in the DISD. Each school Crime Stoppers program is separately administered but is funded by GDCC.

YCC continues to increase the scope of these juvenile programs. Dallas ministers asked the GDCC to help with summer jobs for youths and jobs for ex-convicts. The Dallas Chamber worked on this with GDCC. Events included a first ever Youth Crime Prevention Conference at El Centro College hosted by the President of the College and DPD Chief Ben Click. 1999 concluded with the formation of a task force on underage drinking chaired by USA Paul Coggins. The urgency of this program was kindled by a DPD raid in Deep Ellum in March, 1999 where several hundred juveniles were cited for underage consumption of alcohol.

Crime Stoppers has been a strong program within GDCC since its beginning. Support for the Crime Stoppers program continued to grow with over

10,000 callers during 1992. The calls solved 454 felonies, including 19 homicides, 3 sexual assaults, 77 robberies and \$593,340.00 in recoveries. In 1999 a letter from Chief of Police Bennie R Click of DPD summarized the value of the GDCC and the Crime Stoppers program. Since Crime Stoppers arrival in the city, the program included 22 area cities, 3182 awards have been paid totaling \$826,695.00. 4109 felony arrest and \$5,612,737.00 in recoveries have been made by police as a direct result of the program. The Crime of the Week production on local television and the Most Wanted Ads in the newspaper have further contributed to public cooperation.

Toward the end of the decade there had been 50% increase in overall membership in GDCC, and DISD had added Campus Crime Stoppers. Other programs included police mentoring, Kids and Cops Trading Cards, Handgun Safety, Bikes for Kids, Red Ribbon Campaign, Mothers Against Teen Violence, and Send a Kid to Camp. Better Kids, Better Dallas had advanced with Scholastic Superstars, where over 5000 young people signed contracts with police officers. The Scholarship Fund offered 120 "at risk" students an opportunity to further their education through the Dallas County Community College (DCCC). The Neighborhood Crime Watch, through BKBD, was provided with funding for 37 communities. This financial assistance was to create and sustain crime watch groups.⁶

⁶ In an interview on August 23, 2000, Donna Halstead advised she was still active in BKBD even though she was Executive Director of the Dallas Citizen's Council now, in

The commission began to push more strongly for more minority representation in its rolls. They talked about ways to broaden the Commission's ethnic base. There was agreement to call on the leadership from the city's minority groups. GDCC has moved forward since its 1957 call for non-violent integration of the public schools. It has many minority members including a minority Chairman of the Board. As it moves into the new century, the direction the Commission takes will likely follow the pragmatic pattern of its past.

1994 she was on the City Council. She found the experience of working with the kids in BKBD so rewarding that it was hard to consider it as "work". The kids and cops aspect, are continuing to flourish. When police determine a need in their community that needs funding and it involves children, BKBD works to furnish the necessary funds. Her views of the future of the GDCC reflect the need to disassociate it from the name "crime commission" perhaps a better title would be crime prevention. She believes that Charley Terrell brought her into the Commission.

Summary Analysis

It would be easy to say that the GDCC or all civilian crime commissions are a necessary and effective adjunct to the criminal justice system. They provide funding to many worthwhile law enforcement endeavors including Crime Stoppers and paying for training for many policemen. The Greater Dallas Crime Commission is a leader in criminal legislation. Their work with youth groups has become formidable. This crime commission also furnishes a forum for announcing changes in enforcement or prison policy; and supplies the necessary recognition and awards platform for the area police too. Crime commissions must be examined also, for what they are not.

Crime commissions are an independent civilian group of citizens. That they are not an extension of law enforcement or the judicial system is an important distinction. Agencies that are a part of the GDCC, or other commissions, can depend on them for support. That is the logical extension of their benefit to law enforcement. If they fit into the overall body of the criminal justice system, they would be closer to a political arm than the functioning hands of law enforcement.

Early in this history, the new crime commission was compared to the Citizen's Traffic Commission because most of their recommendations were approved by the city authorities. Most of the plans of the Greater Dallas Crime

Commission were also approved at some level. A separate book could be written about the legislation supported and approved, and initiated by the Commission. Commission anti-drug messages have continued for fifty years. Early endeavors were somewhat naive, today's programs, however, are concentrating on youth education and encouragement which is a covert anti-drug message with more positive effect than simply discouraging the use of drugs.

The work of the Commission in 1999 reflected their continued dedication to improving the Dallas anti-crime skyline:

1. The 1999 State of the Commission report noted that Rider Scott had drafted and got approved legislation to allow commission to retain surplus probationary fees from crime stoppers this essentially means that the Crime Stopper fund will be funded permanently.

2. The Dallas Bar Association offered the commission professional membership which suggest that the relationship between the two groups has progressed a long way since the disputes of the 1950-60s period.

3. Ongoing programs: continue, including the Youth Crime Commission, the Annual Golf and Tennis Tournament which funds the law enforcement liaison committee. Last year it provided \$20,000 for training.

4. The Anti-fraud committee provides an informational brochure for merchants and white collar crime training for investigators.

5. Crime Stoppers has been expanded to the Spanish station Univision Channel 23.

6. Two fund-raisers generated \$66,000.00, plus two grants from the Hillcrest Foundation and the Hoblitzelle Foundation totaling \$100,000 which pays for the expensive crime stopper telecast. Another corporate benefactor was Raytheon Systems who contributed \$25,000.

Raising money is always an issue with GDCC and all other crime commissions. It is important that they remain independent of government support. Their role in supplying funding for various criminal justice functions helps to maintain their influence and prestige. The GDCC's budget for that first full year was \$28,750.00. 1990s budgets approach \$350,000.00. Historically, the budget for the Commission has reflected its growth over the years.

Other emanations from the crime commission were varied from supporting air conditioning courts for summer trials, poll taxes, bail/courts reform, prison farms (cost effectiveness), managing Dallas liquor licenses, help for juveniles, integration, and narcotics problems. As McKee said ".....we are not elected, we are not paid and we answer to nobody" or that there are no "sacred cows". There was wide-spread notoriety, for instance, when County Judge Lew Sterrett disclosed he had revealed the information that led to the DCC investigation of County Commissioner Bill Coyle. Sterrett said he asked the DCC to investigate all the commissioners, including himself, to ensure

fairness. Sterrett recognized the perceived impartiality of the DCC. Other commission members too recognized that simply putting people in jail failed to address root issues of crime. Commission member Joe Balisteri said that only emphasizing punishment for juveniles may be likened to the frustration of “swatting mosquitoes while failing to put oil on the brood pond.” (Annual Report , 1974).

An interesting, and revealing, observation occurred after the demise of McKee. The people who assumed leadership did not have a professional or financial incentive, to help resurrect the Commission. Some were not a part of the McKee administration consequently, there was no embarrassment factor, nor were their businesses to suffer without the Commission. History’s perspective reflects that perhaps only their egos were at stake; that they surmised that since all were involved in this project it was not going to fail on their watch. Very little changed in the years following 1972. The Commission continued to grow and expand its cooperative programs. Eventually, the executive director’s position was enabled and an executive board and a board of directors ensured a thorough administration of programs and administration. Other than the elimination of investigations, little had changed.

Concern about narcotics and support for law enforcement continued but the commission began working closely with other agencies: Dallas Challenge (truants), Dallas Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse; Associated Texans

Against Crime (ATAC), Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Mayor's Task Force on Drug Abuse. Later programs would include a greater concentration on juvenile intervention and community efforts to remove blocks that served to limit, personal advancement of poor or disadvantaged youths. The Commission would continue to lobby for larger and better jails and prisons and to increase prison terms for some offenses.

It is not likely that the Commission changed due to analysis of criminal justice theories and research. Both McKee and the first Managing Director Steve Reynolds discussed some aspects of the environmental impact of crime and the dislocation causes of criminal conduct. There is no indication that either of these studies affected Commission programs. That does not mean that Commission policy was not influenced by changes in the community.

This thesis began with the premise that the Commission provided an organization for citizens to help with the criminal justice system. The population must be involved because the police cannot provide protection without community participation. People who are drawn to Commission work are professionals, businessmen who have a financial and social interest. They want to see changes and believe they can influence those changes. It is not by design that many of the functions of the Commission are supported by much of the current research directed at citizen's roles in anti-crime efforts.

Writers are often critical of efforts to simply enforce the law and not attempt to create more local solutions and crime preventative measures. Authors Rose and Clear theorize that allowing the state to take over the social control efforts of the community may tend to weaken local controls. They propose that by taking more and more criminals out of the neighborhood the local networks of controls are weakened or broken. Additional police brought into the area discourages many residents who then leave the community, diluting their influence as well (Rose and Clear, 1998). Rose and Clear argue that when neighborhoods reach out for the secondary control of the state, usually represented by the police, they are usurping any existent primary and parochial controls. The social disorganization is further reduced because the outside repression, the police, requires little community allegiance. The outside authorities do not have the need to interact with the neighborhood as does the residents who live therein. When the outside sources remove miscreants from neighborhoods there are mixed messages sent to the community. Some arrested individuals, have legitimate jobs, have families who depend on them for support and are believed to be a benefit to the population. Others have offered little of value to the area, were unemployed or were engaging in criminal conduct. Despite this, when each returns from prison, they bring with them the legacy of prison-hardening and new ways to survive as a community thief.

They serve as poor examples for their children and others who once considered them a useful neighborhood asset (Rose and Clear, 1998).

Social disorganization, as described by the authors, is an ongoing concern for the greater community. As social policy continues to add more and more to prison rolls, the momentum places a greater strain on the remaining community members. The constant stress to survive and thrive without husbands, fathers and wage-earners who are incarcerated appears to aggravate existing disorganization. Rose and Clear believe that this policy needs to be reexamined and methods studied to increase the local community controls reducing the need for the intrusion of police. This research could be easily tailored for crime commission application in selected neighborhoods. Neighborhood policing, training and educational opportunities could make a significant impact in a community sliding toward this type of disorganization. Commission programs, including the YCC, BKBD and Teenfest are suggestive of the type of community help the authors discuss in their article.

Parallel support of this, in an article called "Third-Party Policing", has a narrower definition than other research has described. It refers here, only to the use of civil police powers over constituents. If the police believe a segment of the community is either doing something or not doing something that creates or allows crime, the police use whatever civil coercive power is necessary to correct these errors or omissions. An example would be landlords and bar

owners who have the civil responsibility to ensure their properties meet local codes, (Eg., Bars that are too close to schools and churches, drug use in properties that expose the neighborhood to unnecessary criminal risk) (Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998).

A central theme of the article addresses the essential need of individuals and groups to take actions either with the police or co-related to them, to reduce neighborhood exposure to crime. This may include landscaping, cleaning up vacant lots and houses, or generally, to “fight back” against neighborhood decline. The authors focus on the need for the police to *remind* community members of the civil requirements in order to avoid fines, civil suits, police surveillance and raids to name a few. This idea, which is a core element in community policing, is needed to push local areas to do the right things to get started toward a better community. It is predicted that once begun the long-term benefits will keep the area moving in the right direction (Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998).

Buerger and Mazzerole describe one issue that could be a menace to third-party policing. Today the civil issues serve the police as a vague threat to uncooperative property owners. The warnings are in the same milieu as civil forfeitures which are being criticized and challenged in court. It is not an advantage to the police or the community for these local civil codes to be placed in the criminal code. Today, as the somewhat nebulous warning, it allows the police to work with the community to develop a compliant atmosphere without having to address the problem in court.

The authors use existing literature to establish the perimeters of their study and examine two specific groups that illustrate the success of this method. Too often communities rely exclusively on law enforcement when the local citizens may be the answer to crime problems. Like Davey, below, the views held by Buerger and Mazzerolle provide another framework that crime commissions could use to encourage and direct community actions to reduce crime.

Another view of how a civilian agency may target social disorganization problems discusses the *type* (emphasis added) of social contact. Traditional views rely on interaction among neighbors to control crime in the community. A recent writer examines the type of social contact that most retards crime; frequent or sporadic association with the community. Most prior studies did not fully inspect these variables. The author wishes to measure the type of social contact that most effectively minimizes neighborhood crime (Bellair, 1997).

Bellair's research was conducted through surveys of public victimizations of 12,019 households in 60 neighborhoods in medium population SMSA cities in 1977. He included two dummy variables in each equation. The neighborhoods were randomly selected from the telephone directory. Variable index crimes of burglary, auto theft and robbery were used to measure the victim rate. It also included those neighbors who get together on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. Belair's analysis indicates a strong correlation between frequent and infrequent social networks and the reduction of crime. This is not as apparent as would be anticipated; both frequent and infrequent

contacts are necessary. It is promulgated that the frequent contacts supply one type of control and the infrequent contacts allow some members of the community the physical and time separation to perform mediation and counseling for the individual. His study does reflect the success of neighborhood networks in mostly heterogeneous communities, those with racial and ethnic diversity appear to have difficulty maintaining the collective networks.

The author's work is another that could be a guide for crime commissions. Based upon his descriptions, Neighborhood Watch, Night's Out and several of the youth programs, could be interpreted as events both drawing communities together but also providing periodic meetings to reward and express concern about criminal events in the neighborhood. Generally, there would be encouraging community meetings, discussions and efforts to encourage the area's residents. Crime commissions, through their networks and programs can provide the impetus and funding to decrease the social disorganization that contributes to crime.

Warner and Rountree ,1997, believe that social disorganization theories may not be applied as easily as some research indicates in prior articles. Their study indicates the local primary controls may help reduce crimes of violence but not those of property crimes. Further, there appears to be little indication that poverty and heterogeneity are mediated by neighborhood association.

These points would tend to diminish historical dependence on social control at the neighborhood level based on several key elements.

Their study examined 100 census tracts in Seattle in 1990 and surveyed more than 5000 citizens. This was combined with the annual reports of crime by the Seattle police. It supported prior research reflecting significant violent crime reduction in neighborhoods with strong local control. It conflicted with earlier studies about local control to reduce burglaries. Further, Warner and Rountree found little effect of local control in minority or racially mixed neighborhoods.

Racial and ethnic heterogeneity are not congruent to reductions in neighborhood crime, particularly burglary. This suggests that such mixed neighborhoods would require other guidance to reduce property crimes. As applied to the crime commission research, this should encourage commission efforts in projects designed to help neighborhoods assimilate and become more cohesive units. This should help reduce the influence described in this article. That is, commission efforts should be focused on the troubled neighborhoods especially those with mixed or minority populations. Programs would be designed to bring the residents closer together, forming a more cohesive control group.

Finally, a primer for any crime commission addresses overall issues discussed in this analysis. How to address social, community and crime issues

and work to cut prison populations at the same time. While it is not a miracle cure, it does consign many of the problems into a manageable whole. *Fixing Broken Windows* could have been written as a guidebook for crime commissions. It proposes a retreat from building more prisons and attacking the crime problem after it has happened; but to address the immediate causes of crime. This is a follow-up to Kelling and Wilson's 1982 original proposal using the broken windows' theory. It is the simple view that a few "broken windows" may lead to more and more decline in the neighborhood guiding visitors to conclude that no one cares for the building; if no one cares, then more and more "windows" may be broken with impunity. This attitude can spread through the neighborhood until it deteriorates into wide-spread disorder and uncontrolled criminality.

Using records from New York City of arrests, citizen complaints, subway ejections and similar citations from 1988-1994 the authors demonstrate the success of the broken windows theory of crime control. It is a means of increasing police visibility, enforcing social order and providing the community with the opportunity to use its primary control (Kelling and Coles, 1996).

The authors discuss the dangers of "order control" associated with this theory. Their proposal is to enforce civil order at a level designed to control crime without infringing on individual rights. Since many of the crime

problems are not major or index crimes but those often associated with public order, a change of police function would certainly bring about law suits by defenders of the homeless and others who may engage in panhandling, prostitution or other crimes identified with public disorder. This is a concern but should not be overriding as some action that has to change . . . since the old system is failing. Citizen fear, much of it unjustified, and the massive imprisonment of larger and larger percentages of the population is not helping to reduce citizen fear (Coles and Kelling, 1996).

Citizens realize that the police are not the ultimate answer to neighborhood crime issues; they are. The author's model describes the community based solutions. The community must insist on a maintenance of established standards and that police increase their presence by enforcing minor offense violations. Reestablishing order requires many adjustments from environmental redesign to meeting the expectations of the citizens. Once established they must be maintained by the custodians.

I suspect that crime commissions appreciate the focus of *Broken Windows* as it represents an action program for most cities. Applying community pressure along with increased police enforcement illustrates a viable program. It also involves most of the commission membership professions from insurance to lawyers and bankers since all would benefit from a healthier and safer community.

This crime commission began because the leading men in the city decided it was needed to discourage the wide-spread criminal violence occurring at the time. Many were likely motivated by the threat to their economic survival and the demand for safer places to raise their families. These are motivations today and will be appropriate reasons in the future. The GDCC has been helpful to the community and law enforcement for fifty years because it serves everyone's purpose, most of the time.

It is interesting to speculate about the Commission's leadership sitting down with criminal justice academic professionals and debating the Crime Commission's goals. Certainly, the Commission has supported the expansion of the prison system but, it was at a time when no other alternative seemed available or achievable. These same leaders were also responsible for trying to help new prisoners adjust to post-prison life, and encouraging underprivileged young people to be better students, to provide college scholarships for many and thus change the community influence that caused many of their peers to try crime.

This review has shown that the Commission usually wants to use its influence in a more productive and efficient way. Few would agree with the writer that they are trying to control the minds of young people by placing them in prisons; they know that does not work. What they are trying to find is the best programs that serve the community.

GDCC is larger and more involved with the community, now than ever before, especially significant, since it could have easily been destroyed in 1972. This Commission has lived up to and exceeded its promise of 1950. The first year's budget was a few thousand dollars, today it exceeds \$350,000.00. Much of the change in the budget came about through the merger with Crime Stoppers and others. It would be hard to imagine Dallas without the civilian oversight and advocacy of the GDCC. Area criminal justice agencies depend on it for support not provided by tax money. GDCC does not conduct investigations, but it makes certain that those who do, have the necessary training and equipment to do so.

Future Research

Proposed research would extend this study to each crime commission in the United States, approximately 25. A summary of each commissions history would be compared to the crime rates of each area. Simultaneously, a survey of the area's law enforcement, prosecutors, judges and randomly selected citizen groups would gather information about attitudes and experiences with each commission. Newspapers in each area would also be examined to determine the popularity or prominence of each commission.

Due to the general popularity of crime commissions a response rate to the survey should be higher than normal, perhaps within the 80-90% range. Some minority groups in certain communities would likely respond less than

favorably due to their early exclusion from commissions. Preliminary examination may justify modified cluster sampling, eg. , the survey could be sent to members of both the Chamber of Commerce and the Black Chamber of Commerce.

Appendix A

Appendix A

Known crime commissions in the United States are listed below. The core list was obtained from the NACCC. A letter was sent to each member on the list with a request for general information about their funding and membership and date of organization. A short description of the crime commissions that responded is included. Not included are those crime commission organized and funded by local city governments. A copy of a sample letter follows the listing.

1. Austin Crime Commission
P.O. Box 1382
Austin, Texas 78767
2. Business Crime Council of South Texas, Inc.
P.O. Box 460589
San Antonio, Texas 78246-0589
3. Chicago Crime Commission
79 W. Monroe St. Ste 605
Chicago, Illinois 60603

One of the most successful crime commissions and the oldest in continuous existence is the Chicago Crime Commission (CCC) , begun in 1919. The CCC continues as one of the most active and prolific of the crime commissions. In 1999 it had a budget of over one-half million dollars. These funds came from businesses and members who support it with annual donations. It also funds the publication of extensive research beginning with organized crime but including gang activity and youth projects.

4. Citizens Crime Commission of
New York City Inc.
551 Fifth Ave. Ste 1125
New York, New York 10176

This crime commission was formed in 1975 by late U.S. Senator Jacob Javits. Its operations are similar to other crime commissions. No government funds are used in its operation.

5. Citizens Crime Commission of Savannah
303 W. 36th St.
Savannah, Ga. 31401

This commission was organized in 1986. It too is a non-partisan and all volunteer.

6. Citizen's Crime Commission of Delaware Valley
1218 Chestnut St. Ste 406
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107

Organized in 1955 it works closely with area law enforcement. It organized the city of Philadelphia's Office of the Inspector General. Funding is non-governmental. This commission is a not for profit organization as are most of the crime commissions.

7. Crime Commission of Portland Oregon
221 NW Second Ave. Ste. 300
Portland, Or. 97209-3999

8. Crime Prevention Resource Center
605 E. Berry Ste. 104
Ft. Worth, Tex 76104-4300

9. Greater Dallas Crime Commission, Inc.
Dallas , Texas

10. Illinois State Crime Commission
2900 Odgen Ave. Ste 109
Lisle, Il. 60532-1676

11. Kansas City Metropolitan Crime Commission
3100 Main Ste. 201
Kansas City, Mo. 64111

This is the only crime commission known to have been ordered into existence by a grand jury. The county grand jury issued decreed that legitimate businessmen should form a citizen's crime commission to counter the rampant crime in the city. The commission was formed in 1949. It operates

today in many of the same areas as does the GDCC, Crime Stoppers, it organized an alternative prison program and recognition of criminal justice professional. In 1998, its revenues exceeded \$600,000.00.

12. Los Angeles Citizens Crime Commission
503 N. Victory Blvd.
Burbank, Ca. 91502

13. Memphis-Shelby Crime Commission
50 No. Front St. Ste 650
Memphis , Tn. 38103

14. Metropolitan Atlanta Crime Commission

100 Edgewood Ave. Ste 1810
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Atlanta's crime commission began as a result of the urban riots of the 1960s. Then Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr. asked Judge Griffin Bell to chair a committee of civic leaders. Their recommendations led to the creation of the MACC in 1966 as part of the city's Community Chest. Later their funding was directed through the United Way. In 1995 the Atlanta Crime Commission established a broader donor base and including corporate and individual memberships, grants to supplement the United Fund income.

15. Metropolitan Crime Commission
P. O. Box 3485
Jackson, Ms. 39207

The Metropolitan Crime Commission was organized in 1994. It is funded solely by the individuals and businesses it represents. Their programs and goals coincide with the national organization.

16. Metropolitan Crime Commission
Of New Orleans, Inc.
1440 Canal St. Ste 1703
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112-2735

17. Metropolitan Tulsa Crime Commission

P.O. Box 1596
Tulsa , Oklahoma 74101

18. Mississippi Coast Crime
Commission

P.O. Box 1962
Gulfport, Mississippi 39502

The MCCC was formed in 1970 to secure full-time district attorneys for some local counties. They were successful and continued other programs beginning as a watchdog to monitor local agencies. . It too does not accept outside funding.

19. San Diego Crime Commission
7825 Engineer Rd. Ste 202
San Diego, Ca. 92111

The San Diego Crime Commission was formed in 1981. It is funded by private contributions and is a not for profit corporation. It acts in a liaison capacity with area law enforcement and works to help educate area youths to avoid crime.

20. Wichita Crime Commission
125 N. Market #1115
Wichita , KS 67202

Wichita Crime Commission was founded in 1952 by 12 business and professionals who were concerned about organized crime and poor law enforcement. By 1953 their number had grown to 100 members. It operates on self-generated funds. It focuses on youth benefits and support for area law enforcement.

H. Lee Latham
9330 Moss Farm Ln.
Dallas, Texas 75243
Telephone 214-221-0648
email: hleel@phoenixdsl.com

The Greater Dallas Crime Commission (GDCC) has asked the University of North Texas (UNT) to write a history of the organization. A part of this history reflects on the growth of crime commissions around the country. After consulting with the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions (NACCC) your organization is listed as either an active crime commission or a member of the NACCC.

It would help us to include data about your group in the history. If you have a brochure that describes your operation and history we would appreciate you forwarding that to us at the above address. We have tried to find the information on the web sites as available if we have somehow missed yours please advise of the location.

The information that is most valuable is the beginning year of your organization, significant achievements such as crimestopper programs or providing training for local law enforcement or specific funding programs. A flow chart of your organization would be most helpful. Please advise generally of the type of funding projects used to obtain needed funds for your operation such as private or corporate dues, special events or fund-raisers.

Appendix B

WHAT ARE DRUGS?

Any chemical substance which affects the body or mind. Illegal drugs (and maximum penalties for possession) include:

1. Narcotics, Opiates, Heroin, Morphine, Demerol, Methadone, Speed, LSD, Cocaine (20 years).
2. Hallucinogens, Hashish, Mescaline (10 years).
3. Amphetamines, Peyote, Barbiturates, Stimulants, Depressants (1 year).
4. Codeine, Elixirs (6 months).
5. Marijuana (maximum 10 years).

4

DRUG ABUSE



YOU'D BETTER BELIEVE IT!



Courtesy of
Greater Dallas Crime
Commission
509 Mercantile Continental Building
Dallas, Texas 75201
Phone (214) 748-3009

TO OUR PARENTS

1. Your child deserves a full happy life.
2. Only you can properly teach them the dangers of drug abuse. Don't wait! Do it now!
3. Be alert for any change in your child's personality, loss of interest in studies, increased money needs.
4. Consult your doctor or some responsible friend.

DRUG ABUSE FACTS

1. Texas had 403 drug-related deaths last year.
2. 92 deaths were in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
3. 80% of Texas Prison inmates have been involved with drugs or alcohol.

4. Many teen-agers "follow the crowd" and try marijuana, go on to pills, then hard drugs.
5. They become "hooked" addicts, then crime, prison, death.
6. Drug addicts commit the majority of U.S. crimes.
7. Juveniles commit more than 25% of the U.S. crimes.
8. Texas Law provides penalties up to 20 years for mere possession of drugs.

TO OUR YOUTH

1. It is an easy route from a "try-out" to becoming an addict, dependent on drugs.
2. The "I can handle it" types are soon hooked.
3. Be afraid of drugs. Don't let it happen to you.
4. We care and want to help.

Appendix C

JULY 1961 TERM - CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURTS

	JUDGE WILSON	JUDGE KING	JUDGE BROWN
Cases pending July 1, 1961	1,092	1,331	1,017
Cases filed during July Term	225	225	225
Cases received from other Courts	1	2	5
Cases transferred to other Courts	<u>-4</u>	<u>-1</u>	<u>-3</u>
	1,314	1,557	1,244
I. Disposed of during July Term:			
1. Jury Verdicts	13	17	11
(a) Trials - Guilty	7	9	7
(b) Plea before Jury	4	4	0
(c) Hung Jury	0	0	1
(d) Sanity Hearings	1	4	1
(e) Not Guilty	1	0	2
(f) Pleas of Nolo Contendere	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
2. Pleas of Guilty	140	145	179
(a) Penitentiary Sentences	64	77	77
(b) Probation	49	19	56
(c) Suspended Sentence	15	35	21
(d) Felonies - jail time	9	8	11
(e) Reduced to Misdemeanor - jail time	2	6	14
(f) Fines	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
3. Cases Quashed	0	0	1
4. Cases Dismissed	<u>74</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>21</u>
II. Total Cases Disposed of	<u>227</u>	<u>192</u>	<u>212</u>
III. Transferred to other Courts (Co. Criminal)	-1	0	-19
IV. To be retried	<u>0</u>	+2	<u>+1</u>
V. Cases Pending October 2, 1961	1,086	1,367	1,014

Appendix D

Don't be taken in by a ten cent store badge, or an unsavory character posing as an officer. REMEMBER — AN OFFICER WILL NOT APPROACH YOU ON THE STREET OR ANYWHERE ELSE UNLESS YOU ARE IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME, OR ARE WANTED FOR AN OFFENSE. If necessary to see you during school hours, a juvenile officer would go to the school and ask for you through the principal's office.

**OPERATION
ON
GUARD!**

— DESIGNED TO EDUCATE YOU ABOUT CRIME —
— ORIGINATED BY THE DALLAS CRIME COMMISSION —
— IMPLEMENTED BY THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT —

ON GUARD





GIRLS:

The sex criminal comes in all shapes and sizes — tall, short — fair, dark — old, young — **YOU CAN'T RECOGNIZE HIM BY LOOKING, BUT YOU CAN LEARN TO RECOGNIZE HIS TACTICS!**



BOYS:

You will be subject to the subtle approach of the homosexual and distributors of pornographic literature.

THE APPROACH:

1. A stranger tries to talk to you — **DON'T.**
2. A stranger tries to get you to go with him — **DON'T.**
3. A stranger impersonates an officer — **NO OFFICER WILL APPROACH YOU ON THE STREET UNLESS YOU ARE IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING A CRIME.**
4. A stranger follows you — **RUN to the nearest phone to call police.**

HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF:

1. If anyone accosts you, **MAKE ALL THE NOISE YOU CAN — SCREAM, YELL.**
2. One of the most effective things you can do is to **KICK** an assailant in the groin — this will double him up and you can get away.
3. **USE** hatpins, purses, cans of hair spray, and nail files as **WEAPONS.**
4. **GET THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE CAR AND REPORT ATTEMPTED MOLESTING TO SCHOOL AUTHORITIES AND PARENTS.**
5. Walk with a **FRIEND** whenever possible.

THE APPROACH:

1. Invitations to apartments or homes from adults to one boy or a group of boys. **THESE MAY COME FROM APPARENTLY RESPECTABLE PERSONS, SUCH AS LEADERS OF YOUTH GROUPS, BUSINESSMEN, ETC.**
2. Presents of any type from adults — **THIS IS A LURE.**
3. Offers of **LIQUOR** or **NARCOTICS** from ANYONE — especially **ADULTS.**
4. **PORNOGRAPHIC LITERATURE** — This is **NOT** art and don't be misled into thinking so.

HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF:

1. **REFUSE** all invitations or gifts that are offered from questionable sources.
2. **REPORT** any attempts to give you liquor or narcotics or to entice you into questionable activities.
3. Don't let your mind be a trashbasket — **put PORNOGRAPHIC LITERATURE in the TRASH** instead — **THAT'S WHERE IT BELONGS.**
4. Accentuate the **POSITIVE** by participation in athletics, hobbies and worthwhile group activities.



DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT
MEMORIZE THIS NUMBER!

RI 2-2431

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Primary source material from this research was obtained from the Greater Dallas Crime Commission. These included interviews with members and officers. Also made available were original documents from the Commission's archives. Notes examined were from executive board meetings, memos from officers and the commission's newsletters. Some of the earlier budgets remained in the Commission records. Secondary sources are as follows:

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